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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It happens all the time.  With astonishing regularity, courts hold 
that contract provisions are “void,” “invalid,” or “unenforceable.”1  
What the courts do not go on to say is whether, or under what 
circumstances, the party who drafted the contract must remove that 
provision from existing contracts, or must refrain from including it in 
future contracts. 
Any reader of this article can almost certainly think of several 
instances where courts have held contract provisions to be void, invalid, 
or unenforceable.  In the author’s home state of Ohio,2 over the last 100 
years, the state’s highest court has held more than 30 different kinds of 
contract provisions to be unenforceable.3  Many of these decisions 
 
 1. Courts appear to use these terms interchangeably.  As shown within, courts use each of 
these terms to mean that the provision is contrary to law or public policy and may not be enforced.  
See infra notes 3-30. 
 2. The author has practiced law in the State of Ohio for nearly 25 years.  Consequently, 
many of the cases, statutes, and regulations cited in this article will refer to Ohio law.  In discussing 
general principles of law, it is obviously impractical to cite examples from each of the 50 states, and 
Ohio insurance law is fairly typical of that found elsewhere.  Most of the cited Ohio statutes and 
regulations are either verbatim or slightly modified variations of NAIC model legislation.  Further, 
there is no question that courts in other states regularly invalidate policy provisions while providing 
no guidance as to whether the invalidated provision must be removed from the policy.  To cite just 
one very common example, at least ten states have held that state law mandatory minimum 
coverage requirements negate intentional act exclusions in auto insurance policies.  See, e.g., Speros 
v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28, 36-37, n.6 (Utah 2004).  
 3. See infra note 4.  This paper addresses the situation where a contract or policy provision 
has been invalidated by the highest court of a state.  Needless to say, there are even more occasions 
where a provision has been declared to be invalid and unenforceable by a trial court or an 
intermediate court of appeals, but where the state’s highest court has not passed on the question of 
its validity.  Occasionally, this happens even where a state statute explicitly permits the exclusion.  
One example of this occurred in Burnett v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 875 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2007), rev’d, 890 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio 2008).  In that case, the court of appeals held that a state statute 
that expressly permitted “household exclusions” in uninsured/underinsured motorist policies 
violated Equal Protection.  Id. at 646.  The court therefore invalidated both the exclusion and the 
statute that permitted it.  Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court later reversed, holding that the application of 
the statute to that case did not violate Equal Protection.  Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 890 
N.E.2d 307, 308 (Ohio 2008).  Because the decision of an intermediate court of appeals has no 
binding effect outside of its own limited geographic jurisdiction, the author believes that insurers 
should not be required to remove a policy provision based on the decision of an inferior court.  The 
proposed model legislation found at Appendix A expressly recognizes that no duty to remove a 
provision would arise unless and until the provision has been invalidated by a state’s highest court. 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/6
11-TUCKER_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:27 PM 
2009] DISAPPEARING INK 521 
invalidated very ordinary provisions found in contracts of every stripe.4  
Thus, many sorts of provisions in many kinds of contracts have been 
held to be void, invalid, and/or unenforceable.  But insurance contracts 
seem to draw special (perhaps unwelcome) attention from the courts.  
The Ohio Supreme Court has invalidated several provisions found in 
insurance policies.5 
 
 4. Examples of invalidated provisions include one requiring arbitration of child custody and 
parental visitation disputes, Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 304 (Ohio 2001); provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements inconsistent with statutory requirements, Streetsboro Educ. Assoc. 
v. Streetsboro City Sch. Dist., 626 N.E.2d 110, 115 (Ohio 1994); a political “check off” provision in 
a collective bargaining agreement, City of Cincinnati v. Ohio Council 8, 576 N.E.2d 745, 752 (Ohio 
1991); a condominium management provision that exceeded the length of time permitted by statute.  
McKnight v. Bd. of Dir., Anchor Pointe Boat-A-Minium Assoc., Inc., 512 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ohio 
1987); “penalty” provisions (as distinguished from reasonable liquidated damages provisions).  
Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392, 393-94 (Ohio 1984); a licensing agreement 
provision requiring the licensee to operate a full-service gasoline station that was in conflict with a 
statute, State ex rel. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Orteca, 409 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ohio 1980); 
unreasonable restrictions in a covenant not to compete, Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 200 
N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ohio 1964); usurious contracts in violation of a statute, Angevine v. Midwest Fin. 
Corp., 187 N.E.2d 24, 26 (Ohio 1962); a provision in a mortgage purporting to authorize a breaking 
and entering by the mortgagee, Hileman v. Harter Bank & Trust Co., 186 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ohio 
1962); an oral agreement to make a will, Sherman v. Johnson, 112 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ohio 1953);  
an attorney fee provision in a workers’ compensation case calling for a fee greater than that 
specified by the statute, Adkins v. Staker, 198 N.E. 575, 577 (Ohio 1935); an oral agreement to 
extend a real estate listing, Franke v. Blair Realty Co., 164 N.E. 353, 356 (Ohio 1928); exculpatory 
language in contracts between a telegraph company and its customers, Telegraph Co. v. Griswold, 
37 Ohio St. 301, 313 (1881); and a contract provision requiring one party to pay the other party’s 
attorney fees in any breach of contract action, State v. Taylor, 10 Ohio 378 (1841). 
 5. These include a provision in an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy requiring that the 
insured suffer bodily injury in order to recover uninsured motorist benefits, Moore v. State Auto 
Mut. Ins. Co., 723 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ohio 2000); a provision in an uninsured/underinsured motorist 
policy restricting available benefits to a single per person limit for holders of all bodily injury and 
consortium claims arising out of a single bodily injury, Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 
913, 917 (Ohio 1996); a provision in an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy requiring physical 
contact as a prerequisite to recovery, Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 662 N.E.2d 280, 283 
(Ohio 1996); a provision in an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy stating that coverage does 
not apply to the use of any motor vehicle by an insured to carry persons or property for a fee, 
Stanton v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 623 N.E.2d 1197, 1200 (Ohio 1993); a liability insurance 
provision that purports to consolidate wrongful death damages suffered by individuals, Savoie v. 
Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ohio 1993); a policy provision stating that an 
arbitration award not exceeding the financial responsibility limits is binding, but that it is not 
nonbinding if the award exceeds such limits, Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1249 
(Ohio 1992); the “household exclusion” in an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy, State Farm 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309, 311-12 (Ohio 1992); an uninsured motorist policy 
provision restricting coverage to bodily injury or death sustained by a member of the named 
insured’s household, Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 555, 560 (Ohio 1982); a 
provision in an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy excluding coverage for injuries sustained 
while riding a snowmobile, Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kott, 403 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio 
1980); a provision in an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy reducing benefits by the amount of 
any workers’ compensation payments received by the claimant, Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
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This list includes only these decisions of the state’s court of last 
resort.  It does not even begin to touch upon the provisions invalidated 
by decisions of inferior trial courts and intermediate courts of appeal 
which, for one reason or another, never reached the Supreme Court.6  
And those intermediate appellate courts, it should be noted, have not 
limited themselves to invalidating provisions that are contrary to state 
statutes.  In at least one case, a court of appeals held that an “other 
owned auto” exclusion in an uninsured motorist endorsement was 
invalid and unenforceable, even though the provision was expressly 
permitted by statute.7  In another case, an Ohio court of appeals 
invalidated a policy exclusion of uninsured motorist coverage where the 
insured had executed a fully compliant rejection in 1994, but had not 
signed another rejection for the 1996 policy year.8  The court so ruled 
even though the version of the controlling statute specifically provided 
that “unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, such 
coverages need not be provided in a supplemental renewal policy where 
the named insured has rejected the coverages in connection with the 
policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.”9 
As shown above, the problem of invalid provisions is not limited to 
contracts of insurance.  And insofar as the problem applies to insurance 
contracts, it is not limited to invalid exclusions.  Some grants of 
insurance coverage are also invalid and unenforceable.  Some states now 
permit insurance coverage to be available for punitive damages, despite 
the adverse effects such insurance might have on the two purposes of 
punitive damages, which are to punish the wrongdoer and to deter 
others.  In other states, the legislature has expressly forbidden insurers to 
provide coverage for punitive damage awards.10  But policies containing 
 
Co., 294 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ohio 1973); and an “other insurance” clause purporting to relieve the 
insurer from liability where the insured had other similar insurance, Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. 
Co., 266 N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ohio 1971). 
 6. This problem is also addressed in the proposed legislation included as Appendix A to this 
article.  Consistent with current practice, the author believes that insurers should be required to 
refrain from enforcing contractual provisions within the geographic boundaries of the jurisdiction of 
an intermediate appellate court that has invalidated the decision, but should not be required to 
remove that provision from its policies because it may well be valid and enforceable elsewhere in 
the state. 
 7. Burnett v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Cos., 875 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, 890 
N.E.2d 307 (Ohio 2008).  The court of appeals reached this conclusion by finding that the statute 
that authorized the exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.  The Ohio Supreme Court later reversed. 
 8. Fleishour v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1540 at *4. 
 9. The applicable version of R.C. 3937.18 was that enacted by S.B. 20, which went into 
effect on October 20, 1994.   
 10. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.182 (West 2009). 
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grants of coverage are often sold in states where insurance coverage for 
punitive damages is deemed to be contrary to public policy.11 
Most states also prohibit insurance coverage for intentional torts.  It 
has been stated that “[i]n the case of a ‘direct intent’ tort, the presence of 
insurance would encourage those who deliberately harm another.”12  
However, states may and often do permit employers to purchase 
coverage for workplace intentional torts, where the employee may avoid 
the bar of statutory immunity for the employer if it can be shown that the 
employer knew that a serious risk of physical injury was present and that 
injury was “substantially certain” to occur.13  Thus, coverage for 
“substantially certain” workplace intentional torts may be permitted, but 
coverage for “direct intent” torts such as battery is not.14  The issue is 
further complicated by the fact that some contract provisions are not 
always unconditionally void or unenforceable.  That is, a provision may 
be valid and enforceable in some cases, but invalid and unenforceable in 
others.  Instances where the courts have arrived at this conclusion are 
numerous.15 
A second confounding factor is that, once a state’s highest court has 
invalidated a policy provision, that very provision may later be 
revalidated either by statutory amendment or later judicial decisions.  An 
extreme example of this happened in Ohio between 1978 and 1994.  
During that 16 year period, the Ohio Supreme Court first invalidated, 
 
 11. State Farm v. Blevins, 551 N.E.2d 955, 958-59 (Ohio 1990); Ruffin v. Sawchyn, 599 
N.E.2d 852, 855-56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d 1348, 1350 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 12. Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ohio 1990). 
 13. See id. at 965-66. 
 14. Id. at 965. 
 15. Examples include a policy provision precluding enforcement of a one-year contractual 
limitations period in suits seeking uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage was held to be invalid 
unless the insured had a “reasonable time” to commence suit after exhausting the tortfeasor’s 
liability limits, Kraly v. Vannewkirk, 635 N.E.2d 323, 329 (Ohio 1994); anti-stacking language in 
an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy was held to be enforceable in intra-family situations (the 
stacking of uninsured/underinsured limits purchased by family members in the same household) but 
not in inter-family situations (the aggregation of policy limits purchased by two or more people who 
are not members of the same household), Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.E.2d 809, 814 
(Ohio 1993); contract provisions requiring payment of the other party’s attorney fees have been held 
to be invalid unless they are (1) between parties of equal bargaining power, (2) contained in an 
indemnity contract, or (3) contained a declaration of condominium ownership or by-laws, Crown 
Food Service Group, Inc. v. Hughes, No. C-3-98-063, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21701, at *22-25 
(S.D. Ohio July 12, 1999); a subrogation provision requiring the insured to obtain the consent of the 
underinsured motorist carrier to any settlement with the tortfeasor was held to be valid unless the 
insurer failed to respond to a request for consent within a reasonable time, McDonald v. Republic-
Franklin Ins. Co., 543 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ohio 1989); and antenuptial agreements that are not fair 
and reasonable, Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ohio 1984). 
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then revalidated, then invalidated, then revalidated, then invalidated the 
“other owned auto” exclusion.  This occurred despite the fact that there 
had been no intervening changes in the statute.  The only difference 
between these five cases was the identity of the Justices rendering the 
decision. 
The first of the decisions addressing the validity of the other owned 
auto exclusion was Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Volkmann.16  In Volkmann, 
the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the other owned vehicle 
exclusion was contrary to the policy behind Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 
3937.18 and was therefore unenforceable.17 
Just two years later, in Orris v. Claudio,18 the Supreme Court 
reversed itself.  The Court held that “where a policy of insurance 
contains reasonably specific language excluding other motor vehicles 
owned by the named insured from the uninsured motorist provision of 
the policy, such exclusion is valid, and not contrary to the public policy 
contained in R.C. 3937.18.”19   
Two years later, in Ady v. West Amer. Ins. Co.,20 the Court reversed 
itself again, overruled Orris, and held that “this statutorily mandated 
coverage cannot be whittled away by private parties.”21  After stating 
that “any restriction on full coverage should emanate from the General 
Assembly”22 rather than from the parties to the insurance contract, the 
Court held that “the exclusion [upheld] in Orris is contrary to the 
purpose of the statute”23 and therefore invalid. 
Ady did not remain the law for long.  Four years later, in Hedrick v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,24 the Court held that Ady—being a plurality 
opinion—did not render the “other owned auto” exclusion invalid or 
unenforceable.25  The Hedrick majority maintained that only the syllabus 
(and not the plurality opinion) in Ady received four votes from the seven 
justices, and that syllabus held only that any contractual restriction on 
the coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18 must comply with the purpose 
of the statute.26  The Hedrick Court concluded that the “other owned 
 
 16. 374 N.E.2d 1258 (Ohio 1978). 
 17. Id. at 1261. 
 18. 406 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio 1980). 
 19. Id. at 1383. 
 20. 433 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 1982). 
 21. Id. at 549. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 551. 
 24. 488 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1986). 
 25. Id. at 842. 
 26. Id. 
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auto” exclusion was consistent with the purpose of the statute, so it 
overruled Ady and revalidated the exclusion.27 
Hedrick—which permitted the “other owned auto” exclusion—
remained good law for approximately eight years until Martin v. 
Midwestern Group Ins. Co.28  In Martin, the Supreme Court overruled 
Hedrick, and again invalidated the “other owned auto” exclusion.29  
Shortly thereafter, the Ohio legislature responded by amending the 
uninsured/underinsured motorist statute to explicitly permit “other 
owned auto” exclusions.30 
Somewhat surprisingly, the issue of whether and when invalid 
contract provisions—especially insurance policy provisions—must be 
removed has received scant attention from the courts, commentators, and 
regulators.  In one recent article, the author addressed the question of 
whether an attorney may, consistent with the ethical duties owed under 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, either draft a contract clause 
of doubtful validity to try to gain an advantage (while exposing his client 
to the risk that the clause will not be valid) or propose a contract clause 
that is unquestionably invalid (whether the lawyer knows it or not).31  
But that article spoke only to the ethical obligations of attorneys, and did 
not directly address the question of whether, when, or how a party to a 
contract that contains an invalid provision must respond to a court 
decision invalidating that provision.   
Nearly two decades ago, Bailey Kuklin wrote an article addressing 
the knowing inclusion of unenforceable contract and lease terms in 
ordinary commercial contracts.32  Kuklin reviewed the then-existing 
statutes and case law, ultimately concluding that “the common law 
courts have not developed a general remedy” for this problem and that 
“if a general remedy is called for, it may be up to the legislatures to 
provide it.”33  But Kuklin’s article was not directed to the insurance 
industry in particular, nor did it address the question of what must or 
 
 27. Id. at 843. 
 28. 639 N.E.2d 438 (Ohio 1994). 
 29. Id. at 441 (“Because we do not believe Hedrick is in accord with the law of our state, 
which is that uninsured motorist coverage was designed by the General Assembly to protect 
persons, not vehicles, we now expressly overrule it.”). 
 30. H.B. 261 was passed by the legislature, signed by the governor, and went into effect on 
September 3, 1997.  It amended R.C. § 3937.18. 
 31. Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 487 (2006). 
 32. Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 
U. CIN. L. REV. 845 (1988). 
 33. Id. at 914-15. 
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should happen where one party has included a policy provision believing 
in good faith that it is valid and enforceable, only to have that provision 
later nullified by the courts.  It also did not address the unique nature of 
the insurance industry and the frequently observed tension between the 
courts and the legislature, as illustrated above.   
This article, then, is intended to address how insurers should be 
expected to respond to court decisions invalidating policy provisions.  
Ultimately, the author proposes model legislation for consideration by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 
II.  THE PROBLEM 
A.  Insurers Sometimes Retain Invalid Policy Provisions 
As shown by the cases cited in Section II(C) below, insurers 
sometimes retain provisions in their policies even after they have been 
invalidated.34  The reasons why this may be the case are discussed in 
subsection II(B) below.  But by way of overview, there are at least eight 
legal reasons—plus one practical reason—why this may be the case.  
First and foremost, there appears to be not even a single reported 
decision invalidating a policy provision that explicitly requires the 
insurer to remove it.  The decisions almost always say only that the 
challenged provision is “void,” “invalid,” or “unenforceable.”  If an 
insurer ceases to enforce the invalidated provision, then it has 
presumptively complied with the explicit directive given by the court 
that invalidated the provision.  And there appears to be no statute, rule, 
or regulation anywhere in the United States that requires insurers to 
remove invalid policy provisions (or, alternatively, that permits them to 
retain them under specified circumstances).  It is that very absence that 
this article and the proposed rule attached hereto as Appendix A is 
intended to remedy.   
Second, if a policy provision is only conditionally invalidated (that 
is, it is enforceable in some cases but not in others), then an insurer can 
reasonably expect that it is permitted to keep that provision in its 
policies.  Indeed, there is not a single decision from any jurisdiction in 
 
 34. Occasionally insurers file new policy forms that contain provisions that are already invalid 
under state law.  See, e.g., Time Limitations in Accident Benefit Policies, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 17 (Pa. 
Att’y Gen. Apr. 26, 1974).  But that occurrence is rare, and could perhaps be dealt with simply by 
more vigorous regulatory review (at least in those jurisdictions where insurers must file policy 
forms and endorsements).  The more troublesome question is whether and when insurers should be 
required to take action if a provision is invalidated after the policy has been sold to the customer. 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/6
11-TUCKER_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:27 PM 
2009] DISAPPEARING INK 527 
the United States purporting to require an insurer to take any action with 
respect to a policy provision that is merely conditionally unenforceable.   
Third, in some cases, the enforceability of a policy provision may 
merely be doubtful.  If a state’s highest court indicates, in dicta, that 
certain exclusions or classes of exclusions not directly before the court 
may be unenforceable, then the provision has not been directly 
invalidated, but is merely of doubtful continuing validity.   
Fourth, courts everywhere agree that every person is presumed to 
know the law.  This rule has been applied in the specific context of 
knowledge of the effects of changes in insurance law and the 
corresponding effect on policy provisions.  If every person is presumed 
to know the law, then removal of the invalid provision is arguably 
unnecessary.   
Fifth, courts have also held that, despite the heightened duties that 
insurers owe to their insureds, that heightened duty imposes no 
obligation to inform insureds of changes in insurance law.  If every 
person is presumed to know the law, and if insurers’ quasi-fiduciary 
obligations do not require them to inform insureds of changes in 
insurance law, then a rational argument could be made that current law 
also imposes no duty to remove policy provisions that were valid when 
issued, but have been invalidated by a court decision in the interim.   
Sixth, it is anecdotally agreed, and empirically established, that 
insureds generally do not read their policies either before or after a loss.  
Consequently, the removal of invalid provisions is arguably a vain act.   
Seventh, many court decisions hint, and some scholars agree, that 
an insurer’s duty to inform insureds of their rights and the coverage 
available under the policy arises only after a loss has occurred.   
Eighth, there are several decisions that strongly imply that there is 
no duty to remove invalid provisions.  This has occurred, for example, in 
a case where a provision in a policy which was invalid when the policy 
was issued later became valid and enforceable by operation of law when 
the applicable statute was amended to permit such exclusions.   
Finally, as a purely practical matter, an insurer may believe (based 
on news reports or industry sources) that the legislature intends to pass 
legislation in the immediate future that would revalidate the challenged 
exclusion.  For example, within days after the Ohio Supreme Court 
changed the law with respect to the validity of the “other owned auto” 
exclusion for the fifth time in 1994, newspapers throughout the State of 
9
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Ohio urged the General Assembly to change the statute to revalidate the 
exclusion and quoted legislators who promised to do just that.35   
B.  Reasons Why Insurers May Sometimes Leave Invalid Policy 
Provisions in Place 
There is no question that insurers have, from time to time, 
permitted invalid policy provisions to remain in their policies.  There are 
many reasons why insurers may believe, perhaps with some justification, 
that it is appropriate for them to do so.   
1.  No Statute, Regulation, or Court Decision Requires Removal    
of Invalid Provisions 
Court decisions that invalidate policy provisions generally state that 
the provision is either “invalid,” “void,” or “unenforceable.”36  Not a 
single judicial decision has ever explicitly gone on to say that the insurer 
was under an affirmative duty to remove it from its policies.   
This situation is comparable in many respects to Supreme Court 
decisions that invalidate legislation as being unconstitutional.  As long 
ago as 1803, the United States Supreme Court held in Marbury v. 
Madison37 that “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is 
void.”38  But when the Supreme Court voids a law as being 
unconstitutional, Congress is not obliged to repeal it.  Rather, the 
executive and judicial branches simply may no longer enforce it.   
There are statutes that apply to transactions outside the insurance 
arena that do prohibit continued inclusion of provisions known to be 
prohibited.  For example, the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant 
 
 35. The day after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Martin invalidating the “other 
owned auto” exclusion, an article appeared in the Columbus Dispatch explaining the essence of the 
decision and quoting state senator Roy L. Ray—who was the head of the Insurance Committee—as 
stating: “I think we ought to abolish the [uninsured/underinsured motorist] law and rewrite it so it’s 
damned clear and the court cannot possibly misinterpret it.”  James Bradshaw, Insurance Ruling 
May Raise Prices, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 6, 1994, at 1A.  A similar story ran one day later in 
the Cleveland Plain Dealer.  That article, published by the Associated Press, quoted and explained 
both Martin’s majority ruling and its dissent, which took the view that “this case involves whether 
[the plaintiff, Martin] should get something for nothing.”  Accident Coverage Stretched: Court 
Allows Collection of Uninsured-Driver Benefits, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 7, 1994, at 8B.  
And on November 10, 1994—36 days after the Martin decision was rendered—the Columbus 
Dispatch published an editorial urging the General Assembly legislatively to supersede the decision.  
Editorial, Auto Rates – Insurance Laws Need Tuneup after Ruling, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 
1994, at 14A. 
 36. See supra notes 5, 15. 
 37. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 38. Id. at 177. 
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Act explicitly forbids landlords from deliberately using rental 
agreements that contain provisions known to be prohibited.39  But since 
no comparable legislation exists in the realm of insurance, an insurer 
could conclude that it is permissible to leave provisions in policies even 
after they have been invalidated.   
A distinction might fairly be drawn between an insurer that 
knowingly inserted an invalid provision into a policy form at the time it 
was initially promulgated or was last revised, as opposed to an insurer 
that has merely allowed a provision to remain in place after it has been 
declared to be unenforceable.  In the first case, the insurer might fairly 
be faulted for intending to deceive readers of the policy—including its 
own insureds—by including a provision that it knew from the very 
outset was unenforceable.  In the latter case, by contrast, the insurer 
included a provision that it presumably believed in good faith was valid 
and enforceable when the policy form was issued.  Further, after 
invalidation, that insurer may reasonably expect that legislative or 
judicial action in the immediate future may restore the challenged 
provision to validity.40  That was certainly true in the case of the validity 
of the “other owned auto” exclusion in UM/UIM policies, a subject upon 
which the Ohio Supreme Court changed its position with distressing 
regularity.   
The proposed legislation attached as Appendix A would address 
both situations.  The proposed legislation would prohibit insurers from 
filing with the insurance commissioner, or first putting into use, any 
policy form or endorsement containing a provision invalid at that time.  
And to the extent that court decisions invalidate provisions found in 
existing policies, the proposed legislation establishes specific 
requirements and timeframes within which removal must be 
accomplished.   
2.  Some Provisions Are Only Conditionally Unenforceable 
In several of the instances mentioned in subsection I above, the 
challenged policy provisions were held to be only conditionally 
 
 39. Section 1.403(b) of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act provides that: “If a 
landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement containing provisions known by him to be prohibited, 
the tenant may recover in addition to his actual damages an amount up to [3] months’ periodic rent 
and reasonable attorney’s fees.”  UNIF. LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.403(b) (as amended 
August 1974), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archieves/ulc/fnact99/1970s/urlta72.pdf.  
 40. This is particularly true in a jurisdiction such as Ohio, where changes in insurance statutes 
and decision law are commonplace. 
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unenforceable.  That is, they are enforceable in some situations, but not 
in others.   
One spectacular example of a policy provision that may be 
conditionally unenforceable (at least in some jurisdictions) is the 
pollution exclusion.  The qualified (or “sudden and accidental”) 
pollution exclusion was first introduced into ISO policies in 1973, the 
absolute pollution exclusion was first inserted in 1986, and the “total” 
pollution exclusion was introduced in approximately 1990.41  All of 
these variants excluded, to one degree or another, the “discharge” or 
“release” of “pollutants.”   
Other writers have thoroughly documented the misrepresentations 
made by insurance industry trade organizations in connection with the 
adoption of the 1970 qualified pollution exclusion and the 1986 absolute 
pollution exclusion.42  For example, in 1970, one of the Insurance 
Services Office’s predecessors circulated a document in connection with 
the submission of the qualified pollution exclusion suggesting that it 
“clarified but did not reduce the scope of coverage” provided in earlier 
versions of the CGL policy.43  And when the “absolute” pollution 
exclusion was introduced, the ISO stated in a 1984 explanatory 
memorandum that “clean-up costs are specifically excluded as a 
clarification of current intent,”44 thus implying that the exclusion was 
intended to do little more than preserve the status quo except to exclude 
coverage for Superfund liabilities.   
The conflict between the extraordinarily broad language of the 
pollution exclusions (particularly the absolute and total pollution 
exclusions) and the insurer representations as to the intended scope came 
to a head in 1993, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey rendered its 
decision in Morton Int’l, Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co. of America.45  In 
Morton, the Court was called upon to construe the qualified pollution 
exclusion, which precludes coverage for releases unless they were both 
abrupt and accidental.46  The Morton Court held that the language of the 
 
 41. Patrick J. Wielinski, Liability Insurance Coverage for Mold Exposures (Jan. 17, 2003) at 
3-6, http://www.cbylaw.com/publications/pjw-Lorman%20Mold%20Jan%202003.pdf. 
 42. See, e.g., John A. MacDonald, Decades of Deceit: The Insurance Industry Incursion into 
the Regulatory and Judicial Systems, 7 COVERAGE 3 (Nov./Dec. 1997); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason 
and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” Exclusion in Context and in Accord with its 
Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1998). 
 43. MacDonald, supra note 42, at 6-7. 
 44. Id. at 8. 
 45. 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993). 
 46. Id. at 834. 
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qualified pollution exclusion unambiguously precluded coverage for 
releases of pollutants unless they were both abrupt and accidental.47   
But because of the insurance industry’s “presentation and 
characterization of the standard pollution-exclusion clause to state 
regulators,” the Court expressly “decline[d] to enforce the standard 
pollution-exclusion clause as written.”48  Instead, the Court held that the 
qualified pollution exclusion—even though unambiguous—could only 
be enforced in cases where “the insured intentionally discharged, 
disbursed, released, or caused the escape of a known pollutant,”49 which 
had been the scope of coverage under the predecessor CGL policy.   
The New Jersey Supreme Court later applied exactly the same 
reasoning to the 1986 absolute pollution exclusion.  In Nav-Its, Inc. v. 
Selective Inc. Co. of America,50 the Court quoted with approval the 
language from its earlier decision in Morton, wherein it stated that it 
would “decline to enforce the pollution-exclusion clause as written.”51  
Instead, the Court held that the clause would be enforceable only to the 
extent that it applied to “those hazards traditionally associated with 
environmentally related claims.”52   
The West Virginia Supreme Court has limited the enforceability of 
the pollution exclusion in precisely the same way.  In Joy Tech. Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,53 the Court discussed two days of hearings held by 
the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner when the absolute pollution 
exclusion was being considered.54  During that hearing, Liberty Mutual 
included as part of its submission an explanatory memorandum which 
stated in part that: 
The above exclusion [the exclusion which is in issue in the present 
case] clarifies this situation so as to avoid any question of intent.  
Coverage is continued for pollution or contamination caused injuries 
where the pollution or contamination results from an accident . . . .55 
After reviewing this testimony, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
held that despite the broad language of the pollution exclusion, “the 
 
 47. Id. at 847 (“If applied as written, . . . the clause sharply and dramatically would restrict the 
coverage that previously had been provided under CGL policies for property damage caused by 
accidental pollution . . . .”). 
 48. Id. at 848. 
 49. Id.  
 50. 869 A.2d 929 (N.J. 2005). 
 51. Id. at 937. 
 52. Id. at 938. 
 53. 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992). 
 54. Id. at 498-99. 
 55. Id. at 499 (emphasis added). 
13
Tucker: Disappearing Ink
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
11-TUCKER_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:27 PM 
532 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:519 
policies issued by Liberty Mutual covered pollution damage, even if it 
resulted over a period of time and was gradual, so long as it was not 
expected or intended.”56 
A federal court applying Pennsylvania law recently concluded that 
regulatory estoppel may be used to expand the qualified pollution 
exclusion based on the insurer’s representations to state insurance 
regulators that the “sudden and accidental” language of the qualified 
pollution exclusion did not involve a substantial decrease in coverage 
from the prior language.57   
In three other states, pollution exclusions have been limited, or held 
unenforceable altogether, by administrative regulation.  In Louisiana, the 
Department of Insurance promulgated an Advisory Letter,58 which 
summarized the conclusions it reached after “an extensive three year 
review of the use of standard pollution exclusions.”59  The Department 
observed that insurers had sometimes denied coverage because of the 
standard pollution exclusion “even though there was no underlying 
pollution incident which would justify the use of the exclusion.”60  
While the Advisory Letter did not detail the precise representations that 
had been made as part of the approval process, the Department was 
clearly concerned that misrepresentations had been made, stating that it 
would “take such action as is necessary to assure that the integrity of the 
regulatory process is not undermined,” and that “it is of critical 
importance that such exclusions are used in a manner which is consistent 
with their stated purpose.”61  The Advisory Letter stated that the 
“parameters for a reasonable denial of coverage . . . under a standard 
pollution exclusion, are set by (1) the regulatory record which 
establishes the stated purpose of the exclusion . . . .”62  Therefore, the 
Department established four factors that each insurer must consider on a 
case-by-case basis in deciding whether the policy’s pollution exclusion 
was enforceable.63   
 
 56. Id. at 500. 
 57. Simon Wrecking Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 530 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714 (E.D. Pa. 2008), on 
reconsideration, 541 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Pa. 2001)). 
 58. Use of Standard Pollution Exclusions, La Dept. of Ins. Advisory Letter No. 97-1 (June 4, 
1997). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The Advisory Letter stated in pertinent part that: 
Therefore, in handling claims the LDOI strongly advises insurers to consider the 
following in deciding whether or not a claim triggers a policy’s pollution exclusion.  1) 
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Pollution exclusions have been rendered unenforceable by 
administrative action in Vermont and Minnesota.  In Vermont, the 
Department of Insurance and Banking promulgated regulations 
rendering such clauses invalid, and that declaration of invalidity has 
been upheld by the courts.64  And in Minnesota, the Commissioner of 
Commerce had declared that pollution exclusions in general liability 
policies must contain an exception for hostile fire.65  Under that ruling, 
“any individual insurer wishing to use such an endorsement would need 
the approval of the Department, which would approve ‘reasonable’ 
filings on an individual basis.”66  In one case where the insurer neither 
sought nor obtained the approval of the pollution exclusion endorsement 
attached to the insured’s policy, a Minnesota court held that the 
endorsement was unenforceable.67   
It is therefore clear that one of the most frequently litigated 
exclusions in CGL policies today—the “pollution exclusion” in its 
various forms—is conditionally unenforceable in some jurisdictions.68  
Insurers are consequently faced with the problem of how to deal with 
policy provisions that may legitimately be enforced in some cases, but 
not in others.   
 
Does the claim involve an incident which caused an environmentally significant 
discharge of pollutants resulting in environmental damage?  2) Do the policyholder’s 
regular business activities place it in the category of an ‘intentional active industrial 
polluter’?  3) Does the claim involve an injury alleged to have been caused by a product, 
including exposure to fumes, which was being used in accordance with its intended 
purpose?  4) Does the claim involve an injury alleged to have been caused by exposure 
to asbestos or lead? 
 
If the answer is “NO” to (1) or (2) or “YES” to (3) or (4) of the above the denial of 
coverage and/or refusal to provide a defense may result in administrative action. 
Id. 
 64. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 838 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D. Vt. 1993) 
(citing, Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 754 F. Supp. 358, 371 (D. Vt. 1991), aff’d 
947 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 65. Hawkins Chem. Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 159 F.3d 348, 350 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 66. Id. at 351. 
 67. Id. at 352 (“In this case, North River wrote a specifically disapproved endorsement into 
Hawkins’s policy.  The endorsement therefore lacks legal force . . . . Because North River’s 
pollution endorsement was void under Minnesota law, the district court lacked the power to enforce 
it.”). 
 68. Other jurisdictions arrive at the same result, though they do so by concluding that the 
exclusion is ambiguous, rather than unenforceable.  See, e.g., Andersen v. Highland House Co., 757 
N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ohio 2001) (holding that the policy “never clearly exclude[d] claims for deaths or 
injuries caused by . . . carbon monoxide poisoning”). 
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3.  Enforceability May Be Merely Doubtful 
In some instances, the continuing validity of a policy provision may 
be merely doubtful.  For example, in State Farm v. Alexander,69 the 
Ohio Supreme Court explicitly invalidated the “household exclusion” in 
a UM/UIM endorsement.70  In doing so, it stated in dicta that “policy 
restrictions that vary from the statute’s requirements are 
unenforceable.”71  The version of Ohio’s uninsured/underinsured 
motorist statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18, that was in effect at 
the time did not explicitly permit exclusions barring coverage when the 
insured was carrying persons or property for a fee, where there was no 
physical contact with the uninsured motor vehicle, or the “other owned 
auto” exclusion found in most policies.72  Given the Ohio Supreme 
Court’s statement in Alexander, one could reasonably predict that the 
Ohio Supreme Court probably would invalidate those exclusions (as it 
ultimately did).   
Still, the Alexander Court did not directly address—much less 
explicitly invalidate—the “other owned auto” exclusion.  Should an 
insurer be required to perform a preemptory removal of all questionable 
policy exclusions, even though they have never been explicitly 
invalidated?  After all, it was entirely possible that the Ohio Supreme 
Court might have a change of heart on the subject, just as it had in other 
instances in the recent past.  Insurers were left with little or no guidance 
as to whether they could or should continue to issue policies containing 
exclusions which were probably—but not definitively—invalid under 
Ohio law.   
4.  Every Person is Presumed to Know the Law 
In virtually every jurisdiction, courts apply the maxim that every 
person is conclusively presumed to know the law.73  This rule applies in 
cases involving allegations of fraud or misrepresentation.  It has been 
said that “fraud cannot be predicated upon misrepresentations as to 
matters of law” because “everyone is presumed to know the law, both 
 
 69. 583 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1992). 
 70. Id. at 312. 
 71. Id. at 311-12. 
 72. Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 117th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 1988). 
 73. See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 290 (2008) (“A rule frequently stated is that 
everyone is presumed to know the law.”). 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss2/6
11-TUCKER_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:27 PM 
2009] DISAPPEARING INK 535 
civil and criminal, and is bound to take notice of it, and therefore cannot, 
in legal contemplation, be deceived by such misrepresentations.”74   
This maxim has been applied in the specific context of insurance 
policies.75  For example, in Bertler v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,76 one 
employee brought a personal injury action against a fellow employee 
and the fellow employee’s homeowner’s insurance carrier.  The action 
was brought pursuant to a Wisconsin statute which provided that the 
making of a workers’ compensation claim against an employer did not 
affect the right of the injured employee to maintain an action in tort 
against any other party for injury sustained by the claimant.77  The 
tortfeasor’s insurer filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that 
the complaint against it be dismissed based on the “business pursuits” 
exclusion in its policy.78  The trial court granted summary judgment to 
the insurer based on that exclusion.79   
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin first held that, by its 
terms, the business pursuits exclusion would bar coverage.80  But it then 
had to decide whether that provision was contrary to public policy.81  In 
doing so, it made broad statements holding that the actual coverage 
provided by an insurance policy may be different (and greater) than that 
apparent from the policy’s written terms, and that both the insurer and 
the insured are charged with knowledge of the applicable law that 
expands the stated coverage.82   
In a more recent Kentucky case, a real estate institute brought an 
action against a real estate educator and his competing business for 
 
 74. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 98 (2008). 
 75. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 207 (2008) (“All persons are presumed to know the law, and 
the mere lack of knowledge of the contents of a written contract for insurance cannot serve as a 
legal basis for avoiding its provisions.” (citing Moore v. Globe American Cas. Co., 208 S.W.3d 868 
(Ky. 2006))). 
 76. 271 N.W.2d 603 (Wis. 1978). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 604-05. 
 79. Id. at 605. 
 80. Id. at 608. 
 81. Id. 
 82. The court stated: 
By operation of law and as a matter of public policy, an insurance agreement may be 
deemed to afford protection not explicit from or even contrary to its written terms.  The 
parties are chargeable with knowledge of the statutes and with the fact that policies 
cannot be issued in conflict with them.  Missing terms required by a statute will be read 
into the policy.  Terms in conflict with the statutes will be amended to conform to them.  
This must be the result even though increased liability not reflected in the original 
premium is the consequence. 
Id. 
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infringement of its service mark.83  The defendant’s insurer intervened, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend its 
insured.84  The insurer argued that the intentional acts exclusion in its 
policy relieved it of its duty to defend and indemnify.85    
The insured argued that he thought he had an unfettered right to use 
his own last name as a service mark.86  He also maintained there was no 
evidence of subjective knowledge that his conduct was in violation of 
the provisions of federal law.87  Nevertheless, the trial court ruled in 
favor of the insurer.88   
The court of appeals affirmed.89  It determined that the insured’s 
knowledge that the use of his last name could cause confusion was 
evidenced by a letter he had written.90  More importantly, the court 
determined that knowledge that his conduct violated federal law would, 
for reasons of public policy, be imputed to him because “it is axiomatic 
that all persons are presumed to know the law.”91   
In another case,92 a tortfeasor and his insurer secured a release from 
an injured party as to all claims arising out of an auto accident.93  This 
release was obtained prior to the payment of no-fault benefits by the 
injured party’s insurer.94  The court held that the release did not defeat 
the no-fault insurer’s statutory right of subrogation against the tortfeasor, 
because the tortfeasor and his insurer would be presumed to know the 
law which gave the injured party’s no-fault insurer a statutory right of 
subrogation.95   
These rules also apply to the question of whether an insured is 
bound to know that a provision of his policy may have been invalidated 
by statute.  For instance, in the case of In re Estate of Holycross,96 the 
 
 83. Educ. Training Sys., Inc. v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 129 S.W.3d 850, 851 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2003).  
 84. Id. at 852. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 853. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 852. 
 89. Id. at 853. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (citing Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wireman, 54 S.W.3d 177, 181-92 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2001)). 
 92. Poole Truck Line Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 294 S.E.2d 570 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1982). 
 93. Id. at 570. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 572 (“Those who use the roads in Georgia . . . are presumed to know the law which 
gives the injured party’s insurance company the statutory right of subrogation . . . .”). 
 96. 858 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio 2007). 
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decedent obtained a life insurance policy through his employer and 
named his first wife as beneficiary in 1972.97  In 1993, the decedent and 
his wife were divorced.98  The divorce decree did not indicate any 
change in the policy, and his ex-wife remained the named beneficiary.99   
In 1997, the decedent remarried.100  He passed away in 2003, and 
the insurer paid the policy proceeds to his first wife.101  The decedent’s 
second wife claimed that, under a law passed in 1990, she was the 
proper beneficiary of the proceeds as the decedent’s surviving spouse.102   
In a prior decision, the Ohio Supreme Court had clearly established 
the rule that a person who owned an insurance policy in existence before 
the statute went into effect, and who wished to remove his or her ex-
spouse as the beneficiary, had to undertake an affirmative act to remove 
the ex-spouse despite the language of the 1990 statute.103  That decision 
had been rendered in 1990, 13 years before the decedent died.104  The 
Ohio Supreme Court held that the decedent was conclusively presumed 
to know the law relating to the effect of a divorce on a beneficiary 
designation that had resulted from a judicial decision rendered by the 
Court.105   
If the courts mean what they say, then insurers might fairly believe 
that a lay reader of an insurance policy is duty bound—indeed, is 
“conclusively presumed”—to be aware of any intervening court decision 
that invalidated a policy provision in whole or in part.   
5.  Insurers Have No Duty to Inform Insureds of Changes in the 
Law 
Courts routinely hold that insurers are under no duty to disclose 
changes in the law to their insureds.  For example, in Walter v. 
Allstate,106 the plaintiff’s husband was killed in a motor vehicle 
 
 97. Id. at 806. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 809. 
 104. Id. at 807. 
 105. Id. at 809 (“All persons are ‘conclusively presumed to know the law. . . .’ Thus, we 
presume that for the last 13 years, persons who owned policies in effect prior to May 31, 1990, and 
took no action to revoke an ex-spouse as beneficiary upon divorce intended that ex-spouse to remain 
the beneficiary on the policy.”). 
 106. No. 96-CA-84, 1997 WL 219229 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1997), appeal not allowed, 683 
N.E.2d 792 (Ohio 1997). 
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collision.107  After settling her wrongful death claim against the 
tortfeasor, the plaintiff sued her underinsured motorist insurance carrier, 
alleging that it was a breach of the insurance company’s duty of good 
faith to fail to inform her about a change in the law which effectively 
reduced the amount of underinsured coverage available under her 
policy.108  The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in imposing 
a duty on the insurer to notify its insured about changes in the law, or of 
the corresponding effect on the policy.109   
These decisions holding that insurers owe no duty to advise their 
insureds of changes in the law apply even where the plaintiffs allege that 
insurers owe a fiduciary duty.  For example, in Stefanov v. Grange Mut. 
Cas. Co.,110 the court held that there is no requirement that insurers 
disclose every change in the law that affects policy coverage.111   
 
 107. Id. at *1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *2.  The Court held that: 
The trial court erred in imposing on an insurer a duty to notify its insured of changes in 
the law, and the corresponding effect on the policy.  We recognize the duty of good faith, 
which arises out of the special relationship between an insurer and insured.  However, 
this special relationship does not require an insurer to notify the insured of the current 
legal interpretation of its policy provisions.  Insurance law is typically in a state of flux, 
as cases proceed through the courts.  Policy provisions are often subjected to differing 
interpretations by different courts throughout the state, pending ultimate review by the 
Supreme Court.  In the instant case, the same policy provision has been interpreted 
differently over a relatively short period of time.  The provision had one meaning prior 
to 1993, a second meaning after the Savoie decision, and a return to the original meaning 
with the amendment of the statute in 1994.  The law does not require an insurer to 
attempt to inform all of its insureds of every change in interpretation of the law. 
 110. No. 70209, 1997 WL 476829 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug 21, 1997), appeal not allowed, 687 
N.E.2d 296 (Ohio 1997). 
 111. Id. at *7 (“Lastly, plaintiff-appellee maintains that Grange Mutual, defendant-appellant, 
breached a fiduciary duty to its insured by failing to disclose a change in the law that effectively 
limited plaintiff-appellee’s uninsured motorist coverage to $250,000.00.  While it is true that Ohio 
courts have found the relationship of an insurance company to its insureds to be analogous to that of 
a fiduciary, this court is unable to find case law in support of plaintiff-appellee’s position that the 
analogous duty requires the insurance company to advise the insured regarding the status of the law 
on uninsured motorist coverage.  In fact, the only case this court has been able to find on point 
directly rejects plaintiff-appellee’s contention.  Without any such precedent, this court must refrain 
from placing such an additional fiduciary requirement on an insurance company in the State of 
Ohio.  Particularly when the enactment of Am. Sub. S.B. 20 did not alter the terms of the existing 
contract as much as provide a different interpretation for the pre-existing terms.”).  Other decisions 
to the same effect include Cincinnati Equitable Ins. Co. v. Wells, No. 20286, 2004 WL 1072270, at 
¶19 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14, 2004) (“[I]nsurance companies have no duty, ordinary or fiduciary, to 
keep their insureds aware of changes in the law.”); Burton v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CA2004-10-247, 
2005 WL 2416726, at ¶16 (Ohio App. Oct. 3, 2005) (“An insurer has no duty to inform an insured 
about changes in insurance laws.”). 
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The absence of any duty to advise insureds of changes in the law 
has been held to extend to policy provisions that have become invalid.  
For example, in Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co.112 the insured owned 
and operated an automobile service station.113  Two months before he 
sold the property, six underground storage tanks were removed from the 
property.114  These tanks had been used to store various petroleum 
products.115  After the removal, an investigation revealed that the tanks 
had leaked and that contamination had migrated off-site and into the 
groundwater.116  The insured presented a claim for reimbursement of the 
costs of investigation and remediation.117  His agent advised him that 
coverage would be rejected because of the pollution exclusion.118   
Two years later—and still within the applicable limitations period 
for presenting a claim—the Indiana Supreme Court held that the 
absolute pollution exclusion was ambiguous and therefore 
unenforceable.119  But the insured did not learn of that decision until 
after the limitations period for presenting his original claim had 
expired.120  He then brought suit against his insurer, alleging that it had a 
duty to advise him that the pollution exclusion had become 
unenforceable.121   
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding 
that the insurer had no duty to disclose the subsequent decision 
rendering the pollution exclusion unenforceable.122  The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that the Indiana Supreme Court decision was a matter 
of public record that was equally available to the insured as it was to the 
insurer.  The court was also unwilling to impose a duty on insurers to 
revisit previously denied claims every time a Supreme Court decision 
invalidated a policy provision.123   
 
 112. 846 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 113. Id. at 685. 
 114. Id. at 686. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 686. 
 119. Id. at 688. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 690. 
 122. Id. at 686. 
 123. The court stated: 
Perryman now encourages this court to find that Motorist violated its duty by failing to 
advise Perryman of our supreme court’s decision in Kiger which signaled a change in the 
law.  In this regard, Perryman maintains that Motorist had a duty to revisit and 
investigate Perryman’s claim again two years after it was first denied and determine that, 
based on Kiger, coverage existed under the Garage Policy. 
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If every person truly is conclusively presumed to know the law, and 
if insurers truly have no duty to inform insureds of changes in insurance 
law (including no duty to advise insureds that certain policy provisions 
have become unenforceable), then an insurer might reasonably believe 
there is no duty to remove an invalid policy provision.  This is especially 
true where, as is next demonstrated, insureds are unlikely to ever read 
their policies, making the removal of an invalid provision a vain act.   
6.  Insureds Do Not Read Their Policies Before or After a Loss, So  
Removing an Invalid Provision is a Vain Act 
Many insurers believe—with considerable justification—that 
insureds do not read their policies, so that revising the policy would 
largely be an empty gesture.  The cases and commentators are in nearly 
unanimous agreement that insureds simply do not read their policies.  If 
that is the case—or if insureds consistently consult either their agent, 
insurance adjusters, coverage counsel, or independent adjusters after a 
loss occurs—then insurers could well believe that it is unnecessary to 
remove an invalid policy provision, particularly if they believe it may 
later be judicially or legislatively revalidated.   
It has been observed that “[n]obody really believes that insurance 
policyholders read their policies when they are delivered . . . .  Insureds 
are not policy-readers, and they probably do not read leases, warranties, 
finance charges, or lengthy operating manuals.”124  A similar observation 
was made 135 years ago by a Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court, who quite colorfully described the many reasons why insureds do 
not even attempt to read insurance policies125   
Forms of applications and policies (like those used in this case), of a 
most complicated and elaborate structure, were prepared, and filled 
with covenants, exceptions, stipulations, provisos, rules, regulations 
 
 
We decline to impose such duty.  Our supreme court’s published decision in Kiger was a 
matter of public record, equally available and accessible to Perryman.  By now 
attempting to shift responsibility of his duty to be aware of the law, Perryman would 
have us not only create a new burden on insurance companies to keep abreast of 
developments in claims that have been rejected already but which are still viable within 
the statute of limitations’ term, but also reward plaintiffs who fail to diligently research 
Indiana law within the statute of limitations term in order to timely bring a claim.  This 
we will not do.  Accordingly, we conclude that Perryman’s fraud claim fails. 
 Id. at 691. 
 124. James A. Collier, Readability in Insurance: An Analysis of the Comprehension of New 
Policies, 8 J. INS. ISSUES 79, 79 (1985). 
 125. Delancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581, 1873 WL 4180 (N.H. 1873) . 
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and conditions, rendering the policy void in a great number of 
contingencies.  These provisions were of such bulk and character that 
they would not be understood by men in general, even if subjected to a 
careful and laborious study: by men in general, they were sure not to 
be studied at all.  The study of them was rendered particularly 
unattractive, by a profuse intermixture of discourses on subjects in 
which a premium payer would have no interest.  The compound, if 
read by him, would, unless he were an extraordinary man, be an 
inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confusion.  Some of 
the most material stipulations were concealed in a mass of rubbish, on 
the back side of the policy and the following page, where few would 
expect to find anything more than a dull appendix, and where scarcely 
any one would think of looking for information so important as that the 
company claimed a special exemption from the operation of the 
general law of the land relating to the only business in which the 
company professed to be engaged.  As if it were feared that, 
notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, some extremely 
eccentric person might attempt to examine and understand the meaning 
of the involved and intricate net in which he was to be entangled, it 
was printed in such small type, and in lines so long and so crowded, 
that the perusal of it was made physically difficult, painful, and 
injurious.  Seldom has the art of typography been so successfully 
diverted from the diffusion of knowledge to the suppression of it.126 
Similar sentiments were echoed by the Chief Justice of the Indiana 
Supreme Court in State Security Life Ins. Co. v. Kintner,127 wherein he 
observed that insureds rarely, if ever, read their policies and would not 
understand them if they did.128   
One of the leading insurance treatises agrees that “the great 
majority of persons never read their policies, and 90 percent of those 
who do read them, including attorneys and jurists, would not understand 
them.”129  Commentators writing in support of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations have observed that the proposition “that most policyholders 
 
 126. Id. at *7.  
 127. 185 N.E.2d 527 (Ind. 1962). 
 128. Id. at 532-32 (Arterburn, C.J., concurring) (“Coupled with this situation is the recognized 
fact that rarely, if ever, does an insured read his insurance contract, although the law has said, with 
reference to contracts generally, that a party is bound by what the instrument says, though ignorant 
of its terms.  In fact, realistically, even if the insured had the inclination to attempt to read the 
policy, I doubt that he would gain much more knowledge than he previously had because of the 
technical language he would encounter.  I doubt that most lawyers or even judges (who say one is 
presumed to have read his insurance policy) ever read them.”). 
 129. APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8843 (1981). 
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do not read their policies after they receive them is nearly universally 
accepted.”130   
Even the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts believe 
that insurance policies and other standardized form agreements are 
unlikely to be read.131  Professor Corbin, in his seminal work on 
contracts, also agrees that insurance policies are not likely to be read by 
the purchaser.132  Indeed, the insurance literature is replete with 
references to the widely held belief that insureds rarely, if ever, read 
their policies.133   
These statements, however, are generally made without any citation 
to empirical evidence.  For example, a federal appeals court applying 
Wyoming law recently declined to consider promotional materials in 
construing the insurer’s coverage obligations, even though it observed 
 
 130. Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’ 
Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 363 (1998). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981) (“A party who makes 
regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to 
understand or even to read the standard terms. . . .  Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or 
even read the standard terms.”). 
 132. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (1960) (“The applicant may not even read the policy, 
being discouraged by the number of terms and the fineness of print.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry II, Consent, Contract, and the Responsibilities of Insurance 
Defense Counsel, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 171 (1997) (“Insureds rarely read their policies until they 
have a reason to do so, and even then they are unlikely to understand much of what they read.”); 
John Dwight Ingram, The Insured’s Expectations Should Be Honored Only If They Are Reasonable, 
23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 841 (1997) (“We probably must accept the fact that most insureds 
will not voluntarily read their policies and, at most, merely will scan the first page.”); Amy D. 
Cubbage, Note, The Interaction of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and Ambiguity in 
Drafting: The Development of the Kentucky Formulation, 85 KY. L.J. 435, 436 (1997) (“Given the 
incomprehensibility of the language in many insurance policies, it is not surprising that most people 
do not even bother to read their policies.”); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and 
Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against The Drafter, 30 GA. L. 
REV. 171, 174 (1995) (“Most consumers do not read their policies and would not understand them if 
they did.”); Hugh L. Wood Jr., Comment, The Insurance Fallout Following Hurricane Andrew: 
Whether Insurance Companies Are Legally Obligated To Pay For Building Code Upgrades Despite 
The “Ordinance or Law” Exclusion Contained In Most Homeowners Policies, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
949, 957 (1994) (“Several respected commentators believe not only that insureds do not read their 
policies, but also that no one should reasonably expect them to.”); Dina M. Assad, Comment, 
Medical Necessity: The Cure For What Ails, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 465, 481 (“Since the language of 
insurance contracts is often technical and written in fine print, it is probably a safe assumption that 
most policyholders never read their policies.”); Eugene Wollan & Jeffrey S. Weinstein, Great (Or 
Reasonable) Expectations, BEST’S REVIEW: PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE EDITION, May 1990, 
at 84 (“In the real world, most individual insureds do not read their policies.  They check to make 
sure their names are spelled correctly, and then they file the policy away without a second thought 
until a loss occurs.”). 
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(without citation to any actual evidence) that insureds “generally do not 
read their policies.”134   
Likewise, a New Hampshire court applying the “strong” version of 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations (which honors those expectations 
even when they are at variance with the explicit and unambiguous terms 
of the policy) justified its position by stating that if a policy is so long, 
complex, or technical that a reasonable man “would not attempt to read 
it,” then the insured’s reasonable expectations will not be limited by that 
policy language “regardless of the clarity of one particular phrase among 
the Augean stable of print.”135  Again, the remark that insureds are 
unlikely even to attempt to read their policies was unaccompanied by 
any survey evidence or hard data.  Instead, the “fact” that insureds don’t 
read their policies is simply treated as conventional wisdom not subject 
to any serious dispute.   
Notwithstanding the near-unanimity of views on the subject, it is 
devilishly difficult to find any hard data concerning the number of 
insureds who do read their policies either upon delivery or after a loss 
occurs.  The most comprehensive empirical study conducted to date 
appears to be that described by Cummins, et al., in their book titled 
Consumer Attitudes Toward Auto and Homeowners Insurance.136  This 
work reports the results of a survey pertaining to automobile and 
homeowners insurance which was administered to a random sample of 
2,462 individuals.137  An extensive questionnaire was utilized in the 
survey, which required one to two hours to complete.138  Among others, 
one question directed to all auto and homeowner insureds asked for the 
source of information that insureds would use in determining whether a 
loss was covered.139  Just 11 percent of the respondents indicated that 
they would turn to the policy itself.140  The question and the tabulated 
responses follow:   
4s. (ASK ALL AUTO/HOMEOWNERS INSUREDS)  When you have 
had questions about just what coverage you had in your auto or 
homeowners insurance policies, to whom have you turned to find out 
 
 134. Brown v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 135. Storms v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978). 
 136. J. DAVID CUMMINS ET AL., CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD AUTO AND HOMEOWNERS 
INSURANCE (1974). 
 137. Id. at 3. 
 138. See id. at 233-81. 
 139. Id. at 240. 
 140. Id. 
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the answers—to your agent, to the company that insures you, the 
policy itself, to a friend, or whom?   
(RECORD BELOW) 
                 Turn to Now 
 Your agent         77% 
 Insurance company          8% 
 Policy itself         11% 
 Friend            3% 
 Other (write in)                       3%
 ____________________  
 Not sure                         1% 141 
 
Two later studies have been conducted using far smaller samples.  
In June 1997, a study of 604 Canadians was conducted by KRC 
Researching & Consulting of New York.142  The results of that study 
were reported by The Financial Post in December 1997.143  That study 
concluded that “Despite the $1,000 or more most of us spend every year 
on car insurance, one-third of survey respondents do not bother to read 
their policies. And 40 percent with home insurance have not read their 
policies.”144   
The conventional wisdom was challenged, however, in a survey 
conducted by the Independent Insurance Agents of America.145  In that 
study, the researchers concluded that 48 percent of insurance consumers 
“always” read and re-read their policies and 29 percent “sometimes” 
read and re-read their policies.146   
The extent to which insureds actually read their policies—whether 
upon receipt or after a loss occurs—has not been conclusively 
established.  But the court decisions and expert commentary clearly posit 
that insureds do not—and are not expected to—read their policies or rely 
upon its contents to determine whether an actual or hypothetical claim is 
covered.  Given the ubiquitous nature of statements in the literature to 
that effect, an insurer might reasonably conclude that it is not absolutely 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Jonathan Chevreau, Home, Auto Insurance Misunderstood, THE FINANCIAL POST, Dec. 
11, 1997, available at http://www.pollara.ca/Library/News/news_1211.html. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. The results of this study were reported in USA TODAY, October 23, 1995, at 1A, cited in 
Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic 
Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 550 n.22 (1996). 
 146. Id. 
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essential to remove a recently-invalidated policy provision, since few if 
any insureds would ever even realize that the provision was there in the 
first place.   
7.  The Insurer’s Duty to Inform Insureds of Their Rights and 
Coverages Arises Only After a Loss has Occurred 
No less an authority than noted insurance scholar Alan Widiss has 
remarked that an insurer’s obligation to inform insureds about the 
existence of rights and duties regarding coverage for their losses is 
somewhat vague, and that it arises, if at all, only after a loss has occurred 
and a claim has been presented.147  In his article titled Obligating 
Insurers to Inform Insureds About the Existence of Rights and Duties 
Regarding Coverage for Losses, Widiss suggested that insurers owe no 
duty to take action to advise the insureds about coverage matters unless 
and until they receive notice that the insured has sustained a loss.148   
 
 147. See Alan I. Widiss, Obligating Insurers to Inform Insureds About the Existence of Rights 
and Duties Regarding Coverage for Losses, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 67 (1995). 
 148. Widiss states: 
In virtually all situations, until and unless an insurer received notification that an insured 
has sustained or may have sustained a loss as a result of a covered occurrence or event, 
the insurer has no basis for any action . . . .  
 
After an insurance company has received notice of an event that may be covered by an 
insurance arrangement, the insurer is obligated to fulfill the contractual commitment by 
making an appropriate investigation of the event and then either disbursing the insurance 
benefits or explaining to the insured why benefits are not being paid.  As enumerated by 
the authors of one article: 
 
When insureds suffer losses and present claims, insurers are required to make initial 
determinations of the extent of their liabilities, if any.  This includes verifying the 
existence of the losses, determining sufficient facts about the nature and circumstances 
of the losses to ascertain whether and to what extent there is coverage, interpreting the 
applicable policies to decide what coverage is available on the facts found, and 
determining the amount payable for any covered losses . . . .  
 
Once an insurer has received notice of an occurrence, there is no reason to restrict the 
obligation to disclose relevant information about the insured’s rights and duties . . . .  
 
The substantial body of legislative enactments, administrative regulations, and judicial 
actions protecting the interests of insureds clearly attests that contractual arrangements 
for insurance occupy an important and special status in the United States.  Consequently, 
it is not surprising that there is a body of judicial precedents requiring insurers to inform 
insureds about rights and duties in connection with possible claims for insurance 
benefits.  Some writers have commented that the nature and scope of this obligation is 
not clearly defined: 
 
One cannot predict how far the courts will ultimately extend the insurer’s duty to inform 
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The other commentators that have examined this issue have arrived 
at the same conclusion.  For example, in 1990, two insurance 
practitioners wrote an article acknowledging that insurers owe some 
duty to inform their insureds about available coverage.149  While they 
concluded that “[b]ecause the duty is still ill-defined, its limits are 
unclear,”150 they also clearly contemplated that the duty arose only after 
a loss had occurred and had become known to the insurer.151  In 
reviewing the then-current case law, they concluded that an insurer owed 
a duty to notify its insureds of their rights under the policy “only where 
the insurer has received evidence approximating a prima facie case of 
entitlement to benefits and, perhaps, only where the insurer is on notice 
(because of policy language that a layman is likely to misunderstand or 
otherwise) that notice is necessary for the insured to exercise available 
rights . . . .”152   
Likewise, in Jordan Stanzler’s article titled The Duty to Disclose 
Coverage for Environmental Claims,153 Stanzler opined that “[i]nsurance 
companies have a duty to disclose coverage to their policyholders.”154  
But he too cited and discussed only cases dealing with an insurer’s 
duties after a loss has occurred, including a duty to refrain from 
“asserting an interpretation [of the policy] contrary to one’s own 
understanding, or falsification of facts.”155    
The notion that an insurer’s duty to disclose should arise only after 
the insurer has received notice of a loss creates problems for insurers and 
 
the insured of the contents of his policy. 
 
There now appears to be an emerging trend to impose on first-party insurers some duty 
to inform.  Because the duty is still ill-defined, its limits are unclear. 
 
When an insurance company is aware of something that may be helpful to an insured—
including the existence of coverage, rights related to the coverage, or steps that need to 
be taken to preserve the right to recover—the insurer should be obligated to inform the 
insured. 
Id. at 70-71, 89, 92, 94. 
 149. William T. Barker & Donna J. Vobornik, The Scope of the Emerging Duty of First-Party 
Insurers to Inform Their Insureds of Rights Under the Policy, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 749, 749 (1990). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 752 (“When a loss occurs which because of its expertise the insurer knows or should 
know is within the coverage . . . , the obligation to deal with [the insured] takes on the highest 
burden of good faith.” (quoting Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 250 A.2d 580, 588 
(N.J. 1969))). 
 152. Id. at 753. 
 153. Jordan Stanzler, The Duty to Disclose Coverage for Environmental Claims, 16 BAD FAITH 
L. REP. 9 (Feb. 2000). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (citing and quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, cmt. e (1981)). 
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insureds alike.  In most cases, it can fairly be assumed that when the loss 
occurs, the insured will not bother to read the policy but will instead 
contact his or her agent or the insurer’s claims department.  But in those 
rare instances where an insured does read the policy, it is at least 
possible that the insured could conclude that there is no coverage for his 
claim and for that reason refrain from submitting a claim.  That 
perception may be incorrect because—unbeknownst to the insured—
courts in that jurisdiction have either conditionally or unconditionally 
invalidated the provision that negates coverage.  If that insured then 
neglects to file a claim because of his incorrect belief that there would be 
no coverage, then the insurer will never become aware of the loss and 
the duty to disclose will—if Professor Widiss is correct—never arise.   
8.  Some Decisions Implicitly Suggest that it is Not Necessary for 
Insurers to Remove Policy Provisions that Have Been 
Judicially Invalidated 
Some court decisions not only suggest that it is unnecessary to 
remove the invalid provisions, but also implicitly hold that invalid 
provisions will automatically be revalidated if some statutory enactment 
or judicial change-of-heart makes the provision valid again.  For 
example, in Benson v. Rosler,156 the plaintiff was insured under an auto 
policy that included UM/UIM coverage.157  The Supreme Court of Ohio 
was called upon to decide whether an anti-stacking provision that had 
been invalid and unenforceable under Volkmann158 became enforceable 
after the statute was amended to allow anti-stacking provisions and after 
the policy renewed at least once following the statutory amendment.159  
The court held that the previously invalid provision became valid and 
enforceable after the statute was amended and after there had been a 
post-amendment policy renewal.160   
An earlier court of appeals decision likewise suggested that there 
was no wrongdoing by an insurer when it issued a policy containing an 
 
 156. 482 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1985). 
 157. Id. at 600. 
 158. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 159. Benson, 482 N.E.2d at 601. 
 160. Id. (“The precise question herein is whether anti-stacking provisions contained within 
insurance policies obtained prior to the effective date of former R.C. § 3937.181 are null and void 
where such policies are renewed thereafter.  Stated another way, where anti-stacking provisions 
were contained within the original policy issued at the time this court had pronounced such 
provisions to be against public policy, does the later legislative enactment and renewal of the 
policies with the original provisions remaining revitalize and give legal force to anti-stacking?  We 
hold that such provisions are not void, and are to be given full legal force and effect.”).  
29
Tucker: Disappearing Ink
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
11-TUCKER_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:27 PM 
548 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:519 
“anti-stacking” provision that had already been declared 
unenforceable.161  Instead, the court simply ruled that the exclusion was 
to be treated as if it were never a part of the contract.162   
In doing so, the court observed that five months before the policy 
was issued, the Ohio Supreme Court had declared that “antistacking” 
exclusions—such as the one included in the policy—were contrary to 
public policy and therefore unenforceable.163  But two years later, the 
governing statute was amended to specifically permit antistacking 
exclusions in uninsured motorist policies.164  The insurer argued that the 
previously invalid exclusion was “given life” on the first renewal date 
following the statutory amendment, and that it therefore became 
enforceable at that time.165  The plaintiff argued that, since the policy 
provided that its terms could only be changed by an endorsement issued 
by the defendant, the exclusion was unenforceable because no 
endorsement ever expressly reinstated the previously invalid 
exclusion.166  The court of appeals agreed with the plaintiff, holding that 
the policy provision that was invalid when the policy was issued should 
be treated simply as if it were never a part of the policy.167   
Thus, two Ohio decisions have expressly confronted the problem 
caused by the continued presence of an invalid policy provision.  In the 
earlier of the two, the court simply held that policy should be read as if 
the challenged provision was absent.168  And in the second, not only did 
the court not fault the insurer for keeping the invalid provision in its 
policy, but it actually permitted the invalid provision to become valid 
and enforceable after the statute had been amended to permit the 
exclusion.169  In each of these decisions, the courts could (and one would 
expect would) have attacked the practice of maintaining an invalid 
 
 161. See Burkhart v. Motorists Ins. Co., No. 1167, 1982 WL 2846 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
 162. Id. at *2. 
 163. Id. at *1. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at *2 (“At the time that plaintiff’s policy of insurance was issued, it is clear that the 
existing Ohio law viewed the ‘anti-stacking’ exclusion as repugnant to public policy.  Contractual 
provisions which are contrary to public policy are null and void.  We must, therefore, agree with the 
court below that the exclusion was never a part of the original contract of insurance.  Moreover, 
defendant does not dispute that no endorsements were ever issued containing the exclusion 
subsequent to the amendment of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.18.  In light of the contractual 
provision which expressly limits change in the terms of the policy except by endorsement, we must 
conclude that the disputed exclusionary language was not a part of the policy at the time of 
plaintiff’s accident.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Benson v. Rosler, 482 N.E.2d 599, 601 (Ohio 1985). 
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policy provision, if they were inclined to do so.  The fact that they did 
not could be read to suggest that they found nothing wrong with the 
practice.   
C.  Reasons Why Insurers Arguably Should Remove Invalid Policy 
Provisions 
There are, as the old bromide has it, two sides to every story.  This 
is no exception.  There are a number of reasons why insurers arguably 
are—or, at any rate, should be—required to remove invalid policy 
provisions within some specified period of time after they have been 
unconditionally invalidated.  Each of these reasons is discussed at length 
in the sections that follow.   
1.  Insurers Occupy a Special Relationship That Imposes a Quasi-
Fiduciary Duty 
Courts have analogized the relationship between an insurer and its 
insureds to a fiduciary relationship.170  There is some dispute as to 
whether the duty between an insurer and the insured is a fiduciary one.  
One commentator acknowledged that courts “have on occasion labeled 
the relationship ‘fiduciary’ without elaboration” but observed that most 
courts described the relationship as either fiduciary in nature or 
fiduciary-like without conferring full fiduciary status upon the insurer.171  
That commentator therefore described the relationship as “semi-
fiduciary.”172   
An argument could certainly be made that this semi- or quasi-
fiduciary relationship poses a duty upon the insurer to disclose to its 
insureds that certain provisions have become invalid because of 
 
 170. See, e.g., Motorist Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 590 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Ohio 1992) (“[T]he duty 
of an insurance company to its insured is analogous to that of a fiduciary.”); Red Head Brass, Inc. v. 
Buckeye Union Ins. Co., 735 N.E.2d 48, 59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“In Ohio, an insurance company 
has a fiduciary responsibility toward its insured to act in good faith toward its insured in carrying 
out its duties under the contract.”); Martin v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 757 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he relationship between an insurance company and its policyholders is 
comparable to that of a fiduciary . . . .”); Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 723 N.E.2d 128, 135 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (“The existence of a duty of good faith and fair dealing between an insurer 
and an insured is based on the fiduciary duty imposed upon insurers.”); Moskowitz v Progressive 
Ins. Co., 811 N.E.2d 174, 183 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (“[A] breach of fiduciary duty in the 
context of an insurer/insured relationship arises when the insurer fails to perform under the contract 
or unreasonably refuses to act in a prompt manner in performing its contractual duties.”). 
 171. 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 10.02[A] n.15 (3d ed. 
Supp. 2009).  
 172. Id. 
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intervening court decisions.  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that the “duty to disclose arises when one party has information that the 
other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation 
of trust and confidence between them.”173  Ohio courts have likewise 
recognized a duty to disclose in instances where there is a business 
transaction between two parties having a “special” or “confidential” 
relationship.174  But having said that, these courts have also held that the 
quasi-fiduciary or other heightened relationship between insurer and 
insured does not include a duty to disclose changes in the law that arise 
from court decisions.175   
Moreover, many bad faith decisions imply that the duty of good 
faith between the insurer and the insured is limited to the conduct of an 
insurer with respect to the investigation, handling and payment of 
claims.  For example, in Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,176 the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that “[b]ased upon the relationship between an 
insurer and its insured, an insurer has the duty to act in good faith in the 
handling and payment of the claims of its insured.”177  And while later 
decisions have noted that “the duty of good faith extends beyond those 
 
 173. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
 174. See, e.g., Binsack v. Hipp, No. H-97-029, 1998 WL 334223, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 
1998) (“A party in a business transaction with another with whom he is in a fiduciary relationship 
must fully disclose material facts known to him but not to the other.”); Stern v. The Union Institute, 
No. C-960314, 1997 WL 133358, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. March 26, 1997) (“Where a special 
relationship is found, there is a duty of disclosure ordinarily imposed, and it includes, or may 
include, not only a duty to disclose facts, but to furnish honest judgment and advice as well . . . .”); 
Starinki v. Pace, 535 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (“The duty to speak does not 
necessarily depend on the existence of a fiduciary relationship.  It may arise in any situation where 
one party imposes confidence in the other because of that person’s position, and the other party 
knows of this confidence.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Martin v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. 757 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) 
(“[A]ppellee did not have a legal duty to notify appellants of Martin and the corresponding effect of 
the decision on their insurance policies.”);  Cincinnati Equitable Ins. Co. v. Wells, No. 20286, 2004 
WL 1072270, at ¶¶ 18-19 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14, 2004) (holding that an insurer that issued an 
automobile liability policy did not breach its fiduciary duty to its insured when it failed to explain 
the significance of the adoption of a new version of R.C. 3937.18); Stefanov v. Grange Mut. Cas. 
Co., No. 70209, 1997 WL 476829, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 21, 1997), appeal not allowed 687 
N.E.2d 296 (Ohio 1997) (“[T]his court is unable to find case law in support of plaintiff-appellee’s 
position that the analogous duty requires the insurance company to advise the insured regarding the 
status of the law on uninsured motorist coverage.”); Walter v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-CA-84, 1997 
WL 219229, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1997), appeal not allowed 683 N.E.2d 792 (Ohio 1997) 
(“The trial court erred in imposing on an insurer a duty to notify its insured of changes in the law, 
and the corresponding effect on the policy.”). 
 176. 452 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio 1983). 
 177. Id. at 1316 (emphasis added). 
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scenarios involving an outright denial of payment for a claim,”178 those 
cases nevertheless continue to apply the duty of good faith in the limited 
context of claims handling.   
While there is therefore some uncertainty about whether the 
heightened relationship between an insurer and its insured could 
justifiably form the basis for an argument that the insurer is obligated to 
remove provisions that have been invalidated by intervening court 
decisions, it is certainly an argument that could be made.   
2.  Insurers May Be Obligated to Act on Their Superior 
Knowledge, the Nondisclosure of Which May Be Actionable 
Courts have held that insurance companies essentially occupy the 
status of experts, and that it is incumbent upon them to draft policies that 
are consistent with state law.  For example, in Donahue v. Associated 
Indem. Corp.,179 a husband and wife brought suit against their insurer 
presenting an uninsured motorist claim.180  The uninsured motorist 
provisions of the policy contained an arbitration clause, which required 
that any dispute regarding the amount of payment or whether the insured 
was legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured motorist be 
settled by binding arbitration.181  However, contrary to the requirements 
of the statute, that arbitration provision was not placed immediately 
before the testimonium clause.182   
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that because the insurer 
failed to place the arbitration clause in the portion of the policy required 
by statute, the provision was unenforceable.183  In doing so, the Court 
held that the fact that the insured might never see or consult the relevant 
provisions of the policy was immaterial.184  Instead, because the insurer 
had written the policy, the Court held that it was the party obligated to 
draw an agreement consistent with statutory requirements.185   
 
 178. Drouard v. United Services Auto Assn., No. L-06-1275, 2007 WL 707532, at ¶ 16 (Ohio 
Ct. App. March 9, 2007). 
 179. 227 A.2d 187 (R.I. 1967). 
 180. Id. at 188. 
 181. Id. at 188-89. 
 182. Id. at 189. 
 183. Id. at 190. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (“While it may be, as defendant alleges, that this provision is inappropriate for use in 
the insurance industry, particularly since the insured never or infrequently signs the policy, the 
wisdom of retaining this requirement is not for us but for the general assembly.  It is on the statute 
books of our state and its mandate must be obeyed.  There is a testimonium clause in this policy but 
it is separated by many pages and various provisions from the clause requiring arbitration.  This 
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The Court went on to say that the insurer was not excused from the 
statutory requirements by the fact that it had filed a policy form and had 
received the blessing of the insurance commissioner.186  Instead, the 
Court concluded that “[t]he fact that the commissioner approved the 
provisions of the policy does not give validity to an invalid act.”187   
The same “superior knowledge” argument might be applied where 
a policy provision was valid when filed with the commissioner, but 
which later became invalid because of an intervening court decision.  
The American Law Institute has suggested that might be the case in 
Section 551 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.188  A duty to tell 
insureds that a policy provision has been invalidated could conceivably 
arise under Section 551(2)(a), (b), or (c).  In fact, the official comment 
on clause (a) specifically mentions insurance as one of the types of 
contracts giving rise to a duty to disclose under Section 551(2)(a).189   
For precisely the same reasons that underlie Section 551, the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General has concluded that it is inappropriate for 
insurers knowingly to file policies for approval that contain invalid 
 
policy has been drawn by the insurer and it is charged with the obligation of drawing an agreement 
that conforms to the statutory directions of the general assembly.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 190-91. 
 188. The Restatement provides: 
§ 551. LIABILITY FOR NONDISCLOSURE 
(1)  One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the 
other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability 
to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has 
failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable 
care to disclose the matter in question. 
(2)  One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, 
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other 
similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and 
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or 
ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and 
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a 
previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so; and 
(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be acted 
upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance upon it in a 
transaction with him; and 
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under 
a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the 
customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a 
disclosure of those facts.”   
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1997). 
 189. Id. at cmt. f (“[C]ertain types of contracts, such as those of . . . insurance . . . , 
are recognized as creating in themselves a confidential relation and hence as requiring 
the utmost good faith and full and fair disclosure of all material facts.”). 
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provisions.190  In Time Limitations in Accidental Benefit Policies, the 
state insurance commissioner was asked to approve a policy form that 
included an unenforceable provision.191  The Attorney General 
concluded that he could not and would not approve a policy form that 
would mislead insureds about the scope of coverage.192   
Courts have held that Section 551 imposes an obligation on insurers 
to make disclosures of material facts to their insureds, regardless of 
whether the information is specifically requested.  For example, in Wells 
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,193 the court held that an insurer was 
under a duty to inform the assignee of a life insurance policy that, at the 
time of the assignment, the policy had lapsed for non-payment of 
premiums.194  Likewise, in Butcher v. Truck Ins. Exchange,195 the court 
held that disparity in knowledge could impose an affirmative duty of 
disclosure on an insurer or its agent.196   
Again, in Azar v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,197 the court held 
that material issues of fact existed as to the materiality of undisclosed 
information about the additional cost of paying policy premiums in 
installments.198  A similar conclusion was reached in Smoot v. 
Physicians Life Ins. Co,199  The Smoot Court held that the plaintiff pled 
facts sufficient to assert a common law duty to disclose, which the 
 
 190. Time Limitations in Accident Benefit Policies, 65 Pa. D. & C.2d 17 (Pa. Att’y Gen. Apr. 
26, 1974). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 20-21, 24 (“It has also been contended that no changes need be made in the policies 
themselves, since the Supreme Court has found them unenforceable, and, perforce, lower courts will 
be bound by that decision in subsequent cases.  But, insurance policies containing such terms, even 
though unenforceable, are likely to cause policyholders to forego meritorious claims in the mistaken 
belief that the terms are, in fact, enforceable.  The general public relies on the Insurance 
Department’s duty to approve policies, and, consequently, terms appearing in policies have a greater 
appearance of State-sanctioned enforceability than terms appearing in ordinary contracts.  While 
your department’s approval of a policy is not a statement that all terms are, in your opinion, 
enforceable, you should act to eliminate indubitably unenforceable terms in order that claimants will 
not be misled.  Therefore, when court decisions modify interpretations of specific contract language, 
the Insurance Department must take cognizance of these changes in carrying out its responsibilities 
under law. . . . Common sense dictates that approval or disapproval of contract forms calls for the 
exercise of reasonable discretion.  The insurer as well as the insured deserves the protection of the 
commissioner in avoiding unlawful provisions.  The same reason exists for similar protection in the 
avoidance of ambiguous or other unwarranted provisions.”). 
 193. 85 Cal.App.3d 66 (Ct. App. 1978). 
 194. Id. at 72. 
 195. 77 Cal.App.4th 1442 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 196. Id. at 1464. 
 197. 68 P.3d 909 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). 
 198. Id. at 936. 
 199. 87 P.3d 545, 549 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). 
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insurer breached when it failed to inform the insured of the additional 
costs associated with paying premiums monthly rather than annually.200   
While decisions on the scope of an insurer’s obligation to disclose 
material facts are few, the courts and commentators have held that an 
insurer’s duty of good faith “demands that the insurer deal with laymen 
as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and 
underwriting.”201  Respected insurance scholar Allen Widiss notes that 
under Section 551, “fraudulent misrepresentations can result from a 
failure to disclose information, as well as from incorrect statements.”202  
Further, he notes that the insurer is “in a position to know that a failure 
to disclose the coverage is likely to result in an insured’s not pursuing 
benefits which are available under the coverage afforded by the 
applicable insurance.”203   
In his article, Widiss quotes Justice Tobriner’s majority opinion in 
Davis v. Blue Cross of Northern California,204 wherein the California 
Supreme Court observed that insurers may have an affirmative 
obligation to disclose information to insureds, whenever nondisclosure 
might otherwise result in a loss of benefits or a forfeiture of rights.205  
The majority opinion in Davis provides in pertinent part that: 
[I]n situations in which an insured’s lack of knowledge may potentially 
result in a loss of benefits or a forfeiture of rights, an insurer has been 
required to bring to the insured’s attention relevant information so as to 
enable the insured to take action to secure rights afforded by the 
policy.206   
These precepts were applied in the case of Weber v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto Ins. Co.207  In Weber, State Farm issued an auto insurance 
policy that contained a family exclusion.208  A reading of the policy 
alone would suggest to a lay reader that UM/UIM coverage was barred 
by the exclusion.  However, an Iowa Supreme Court decision had held 
that insureds were entitled to uninsured motorist benefits despite the 
 
 200. Id. at 549-50. 
 201. Widiss, supra note 147, at 75 (citing Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 250 
A.2d 580, 587 (N.J. 1969)).   
 202. Id. at 83.   
 203. Id. at 84.   
 204. 600 P.2d 1060 (Cal. 1979). 
 205. Id. at 1065-66. 
 206. Id. at 1065-66.   
 207. 873 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Iowa 1994). 
 208. Id. at 203. 
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presence of the family exclusion.209  The State Farm policy had never 
been changed to take this Supreme Court ruling into account.210   
The plaintiff sustained an injury and retained an attorney.211  The 
attorney discussed the case with a State Farm representative.212  The 
attorney was unaware of the Iowa Supreme Court decision, and the 
adjuster failed to point it out.213  The Court held that State Farm’s failure 
to disclose the existence of this coverage (which was not apparent from 
the face of the policy) constituted fraudulent nondisclosure.214  The 
Court held that under Section 551, State Farm violated its duty to 
disclose this information to its insureds.215  After citing to and discussing 
Section 551, the Weber Court concluded that “under the circumstances 
of this case, the defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care 
to disclose the uninsured motorist coverage.”216   
On several other occasions, courts have held that an insurer’s 
retention of an invalid policy provision, coupled with its later failure to 
disclose that the provision was invalid when a claim was presented, 
created a jury question on the insurer’s bad faith and potential liability 
for punitive damages.  For example, in Richards v. Allstate Ins. Co.,217 
Allstate issued an auto insurance policy that included a clause excluding 
other owned autos, even though such clauses were unenforceable under 
applicable state law.218  A claim arising out of the use of an other owned 
auto was presented.219  The adjuster who handled the claim denied it, 
citing the invalid and unenforceable exclusion.220  The insureds sued for 
bad faith, alleging that punitive damages were justified not only by the 
denial of the claim, but also because of the retention of the invalid 
exclusion in the policy and the failure to provide an adequate procedure 
to prevent erroneous denials.221  The court held that the continued 
retention of this invalid exclusion was a sufficient basis to support an 
award of punitive damages.222   
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 209. 
 215. Id. at 208-09. 
 216. Id. at 209. 
 217. 693 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 218. Id. at 504. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  
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In doing so, the Richards Court observed that Allstate retained the 
invalid “other owned auto” exclusion in its policy until 1981, even 
though the state Supreme Court had struck down a similar exclusion in 
another company’s policy eight years earlier.223  While Allstate officials 
admittedly were aware of this decision and its effect on the other owned 
auto exclusion, they neither deleted the exclusion from their policy nor 
made any effort to inform their insureds or sales agents of the effect of 
the decision or its effect on policy coverage.224  Instead, claims 
personnel were simply instructed to honor claims that would otherwise 
have been denied based on the exclusion.225  But in the case of the 
plaintiff, that procedure failed and his claim was denied.226   
The court observed that there was no way to determine how many 
insureds may have refrained from presenting claims based on the 
presence of the invalid exclusion.227  It concluded that the failure to 
delete the exclusion after it was invalidated may have been sufficiently 
culpable to warrant the imposition of punitive damages.228  Allstate then 
attempted to justify its conduct by referring to a policy provision which 
stated that “[s]uch terms of this policy as are in conflict with statutes of 
the state in which this policy is issued are hereby amended to 
conform.”229  Allstate argued that “this provision corrected any 
deficiency in the policy.”230  The Richards Court vehemently 
disagreed.231   
 
 223. Id. at 505. 
 224. Id. at 504. 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 505. 
 228. Id. (“Allstate urges that its procedure was successful in every case except Richards’.  Even 
accepting this as true, this procedure provided no remedy for those policyholders who read 
Exclusion 2, assumed their injuries were not covered, and failed to file claims.  Failure to delete 
Exclusion 2 in effect represented a corporate decision by Allstate not to inform its policyholders of 
undisclosed coverage required by Mississippi law.  Whether this conduct was sufficiently culpable 
to justify an award of punitive damages was a question for the jury.  The jury obviously believed 
that it was.”). 
 229. Id. at 505. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. (“This argument strains credibility.  If it were accepted, Allstate could include in its 
policies any sort of invalid exclusion and then rely on change provision 5 when challenged.  This 
would mean that policyholders, not insurance companies, would bear the burden of keeping abreast 
of changes in the law.  Clearly this is not the intent of Mississippi’s insurance code.  Exclusion 2 as 
written and as retained in Allstate’s policies from 1973 until well after 1977 was invalid under 
Lowery.  Under the court’s instructions the jury necessarily found that Allstate’s failure to remove 
Exclusion 2 from its standard automobile policy until after this suit was filed was grossly negligent.  
This finding is supported by the proof.”). 
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To the same effect is Tucker v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.232  In that 
case, Aetna issued a policy to the plaintiffs (and to other residents of 
Mississippi) containing provisions that limited UM coverage in a 
manner contrary to settled Mississippi law.233  After suit was filed, Aetna 
representatives testified that Aetna knew the provision was illegal under 
Mississippi law but, despite that knowledge, continued to incorporate the 
illegal provision into its policies.234  Aetna contended, however, that the 
plaintiff had not been harmed because Aetna had made no attempt to 
enforce the invalid terms in the claim presented by the plaintiffs in this 
case.235   
In determining whether this conduct justified an award of 
compensatory and punitive damages, the Tucker court cited and 
discussed the Richards decision at length.236  It then concluded that 
Aetna’s retention of the invalid provision in its policy for more than a 
decade after it had been declared to be invalid supported an award of 
both compensatory and punitive damages.237  Aetna’s mistake in 
retaining the policy was compounded by its continuing to enforce that 
provision, in clear contravention of the Supreme Court decisions striking 
down similar exclusions in the policies of other companies.238  The 
Court concluded that the dual error of retaining the invalid provision and 
urging its enforcement was tantamount to an intentional tort that justified 
the imposition of punitive damages.239   
Also instructive is Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,240 
wherein the insured was injured in an accident and requested uninsured 
 
 232. 609 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Miss. 1985). 
 233. Id. at 1576. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 1577. 
 236. Id. at 1581-82. 
 237. Id. at 1583. 
 238. Id. at 1582. 
 239. Id. at 1583 (“It is the opinion and finding of this Court that the actions on the part of 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company in maintaining the illegal provision in its policy for more than 
eleven years after the Mississippi Supreme Court had declared similar provisions to be invalid and 
in maintaining a procedure in its claims manual (which was being used in Mississippi at the time of 
the initial adjustment of this file) which instructs Aetna’s adjuster to enforce the illegal provision of 
its policy, constitutes gross and willful negligence on the part of Aetna and entitles Plaintiffs to 
punitive damages.  It is further the opinion of this Court that the actions of Aetna were attempts to 
reduce the uninsured motorist coverage by amounts of payments made under the medical payments 
coverage of the policy in question.  The actions of Aetna were in violation of Mississippi law, and 
constitute willful and gross negligence and constitute an intentional and independent tort.  The 
Court is further of the opinion that the Defendant, Aetna, has acted in a careless and reckless 
manner with disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs as insureds under its own policy.”  (emphasis 
added)). 
 240. 452 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1984). 
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motorist benefits.241  State Farm had retained a clause in its policy 
limiting UM coverage to a single per person limit, even though that 
clause had been struck down twelve years earlier.242  After the insured 
settled for a single $10,000 limit, he learned that the provision was 
invalid.243  He filed suit, alleging that State Farm’s actions in retaining 
invalid provisions in its policies restricting coverage, “without amending 
those provisions or otherwise notifying its insureds that additional 
coverage was available, constituted a fraudulent scheme, plan, or devise 
to defraud its policyholders.”244  The court held that information 
concerning the number of others who had been paid only a single 
$10,000 limit was discoverable in support of the fraud claim.245   
A similar situation arose in Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. 
Tompkins.246  In that case, an adjuster “accidentally” enforced an “other 
owned auto” exclusion that had been held to be invalid and 
unenforceable.247  Again citing Richards, the court concluded that the 
insurer’s continued inclusion of the invalid provision, coupled with its 
accidental enforcement of that exclusion, was sufficient to send the 
punitive damage claim to the jury.248  The court was unpersuaded by the 
argument that the experienced adjuster who handled the claim made a 
“simple mistake” that did not justify the imposition of punitive 
damages.249  The court noted that this “simple mistake” was “not in 
misreading the exclusion but in correctly reading a void exclusion 
contained in his company’s policies.”250   
Finally, in Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Peavy,251 the insurer 
wanted a jury instruction that it could not be held liable for punitive 
damages when its adjuster enforced an invalid exclusion that remained 
 
 241. Id. at 862. 
 242. Id. at 863. 
 243. Id. at 862. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 863 (“The plaintiff/insured has charged State Farm with fraud and having engaged 
in a plan or scheme to defraud its policyholders by retaining a clause in its policies and withholding 
from its insureds the fact that the clause, limiting its liability to one uninsured motorist coverage, 
has been invalid in Alabama since 1970, by the holding of Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Jones, 243 
So. 2d 736, (Ala. 1970).  Evidence of similar fraudulent acts are, of course, admissible to prove the 
alleged fraudulent scheme.  Cartwright v. Braly, 117 So. 477 (Ala. 1928).  Thus, it would appear 
that the time period over which the discovery is sought is not unreasonable, since the plaintiff’s 
claim was made in 1972.  We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.”). 
 246. 490 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1986). 
 247. Id. at 903. 
 248. Id. at 905. 
 249. Id. at 903. 
 250. Id. 
 251. 528 So. 2d 1112 (Miss. 1988). 
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in the policy.252  The trial court refused the requested instruction, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.253  In doing so, it held that the insurer “cannot 
simply ignore changes in the law . . . .”254  The court ultimately 
concluded that while the retention of an invalid provision will not 
always justify the imposition of punitive damages, it is equally incorrect 
to say that it could never be held liable (even for compensatory 
damages) when it attempted to enforce an invalid exclusion.255   
In almost all of these cases, the insurer not only failed to remove an 
invalid provision, but also attempted to enforce it.  While that may be a 
very significant distinction from cases where the provision remained but 
was never enforced, it does signal an emerging concern being expressed 
by courts over the retention of invalid policy provisions.   
3.  Insurers Intentionally Foster Trust Through Their Advertising 
As early as 1979, it was observed that by purchasing an insurance 
contract, a policyholder typically seeks the peace of mind and security 
which arises from the purchase of protection against calamity.256  That 
insureds purchase insurance coverage in order to obtain security and 
peace of mind is well recognized in the literature.257   
It is equally well recognized that, in their marketing and 
promotional activities, insurers focus at least as much on the concepts of 
security, trustworthiness, integrity and peace of mind as they do on the 
substantive coverage itself.  This observation was made more than two 
decades ago in Russell H. McMains’ article titled Bad Faith Claims 
Handling New Frontiers: A Multi-State Cause of Action in Search of a 
 
 252. Id. at 1119. 
 253. Id. at 1120. 
 254. Id. at 1119. 
 255. Id. (“We do not suggest that punitive damages are always appropriate whenever an 
insurance policy contains a provision which is invalid under state law.  An insurer is not, however, 
entitled to a peremptory instruction on liability to the effect that the insurer can never be liable (even 
for actual damages) when it acts in accordance with the provisions of its policy, regardless of their 
invalidity.”).   
 256. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 819 (Cal. 1979), cert denied 445 U.S. 
912 (1980).  
 257. DIANE L. POLSCER & BRETT W. SOMMERMEYER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 2:8 (David L. Leitner et al. eds., 2008) (“People insure themselves for 
peace of mind and security”); STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS LIABILITY & DAMAGES § 
2:14 (2008) (“Insurance consumers purchase insurance for the sake of their personal security and 
peace of mind, not commercial advantage.”); ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES 
§ 9:24 (5th ed. 2008) (“Moreover, unlike other contracts, an insurance contract is entered into in 
large part to provide peace of mind.”). 
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Home.258  One of the earliest observers of this phenomenon was Justice 
Lent in his dissent in Farris v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co.259   
More recent cases have acknowledged that such advertising may be 
considered by a jury in assessing the relationship between insurer and 
insured to determine if it is one of trust and confidence (and therefore 
tantamount to a fiduciary relationship).  That was held to be the case in 
Dornberger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.260  In Dornberger, a 
policyholder who purchased policies through a life insurer’s allegedly 
illegal overseas operation brought a putative class action against the 
insurer alleging RICO violations and seeking rescission in damages 
under state law.261  The insurer moved to dismiss.262  The court for the 
most part denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the majority of the 
policyholder’s claims were maintainable.263  The court specifically held 
that MetLife’s advertising activities—which sought out expatriated 
Americans through an advertising campaign aimed at assuaging their 
concerns and promising personalized service—was sufficient to create a 
jury question on whether a relationship of trust and confidence had been 
established.264  In doing so, the court mentioned that the Appleman 
insurance law treatise had observed that the failure to recognize a 
fiduciary relationship between insurers and their insureds may be “out of 
step with current concepts,” particularly in light of insurer advertising 
activities.265   
 
 258. Russell H. McMains, Bad Faith Claims Handling-New Frontiers: A Multi-State Cause of 
Action in Search of a Home, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 901, 904 (1988) (“A second and related concern is 
the expectation of the insurance-consuming public which the industry has fostered itself.  Allstate’s 
slogan ‘You’re in Good Hands,’ Travelers’ motto of protection ‘Under the Umbrella,’ and Fireman’s 
Fund’s symbolic protection beneath the ‘Fireman’s Hat,’ exemplify the industry’s own efforts to 
portray itself as a repository of the public trust.  But with the public trust may be visited 
responsibility for a violation of such trust as evidenced by recent recognition of extra-contractual 
‘rights’ of insureds or tortious responsibility of insurers beyond the four corners of its insuring 
agreement – particularly in the first-party area.”). 
 259. 587 P.2d 1015, 1028 n.4 (Or. 1978) (“That insurers sell their product as being not only an 
agreement to indemnify the insured for certain kinds of loss but also to relieve the purchaser from 
anxiety concerning all aspects of claims is readily apparent in our society.  One cannot watch 
nationally televised entertainment for very long without being exposed to commercials for the sale 
of insurance which, for example, indicate that the purchaser will be in ‘good hands,’ that he will 
have the assistance of a troop of mounted cavalry, that he has ‘a piece of the rock,’ or that ‘like a 
good neighbor’ the insurer will be there.  As such advertisements reflect, the relationship between 
insurer and insured does not merely concern indemnity for monetary loss.” (emphasis added)). 
 260. 961 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. N.Y. 1997). 
 261. Id. at 513. 
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 550. 
 264. Id. at 546-47. 
 265. Id. at 547 n.39. 
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Regardless of whether the insurer’s duty to the insured is described 
as fiduciary, its knowing inclusion or retention of an invalid policy 
provision will be problematic.  Virtually every insurer would agree, if 
questioned, that there are times when its policy language must be added, 
deleted, or changed.  Insurers must surely admit that there have been 
occasions in the past when they have added or changed policy provisions 
in response to a change in the law (whether it be by statute or a court 
decision), and many insurers have deleted policy provisions from time to 
time over the years as a result of changes in the law.  It would likely 
strike an impartial observer that under those circumstances, the knowing 
inclusion or retention of an invalid provision that is favorable to the 
insurer is somehow unethical, improper, or unfair.   
Most insurance executives would probably agree that an insured 
should be able to determine what claims are covered by reading their 
policy.  If they do, then the insurer will have indicted itself for failing to 
remove an invalid provision.  If they do not, then a jury might fairly 
wonder why the insurer bothers to reduce the policy to writing at all, if 
the customer cannot rely upon it to determine what is covered and what 
is not.   
III.  SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING REMEDIES 
It is fairly easy to make the case that insurers should, at least under 
some circumstances, be required to remove invalid provisions from their 
policies.  But no statute or regulation currently requires it, and garden 
variety tort lawsuits are poorly suited as a vehicle to impose such a 
requirement.  The reasons why this is so are discussed in the following 
sections.   
A.  Common Law Remedies 
1.  There Can Be No Tort Remedy Without Reliance and Damages 
The principal reason traditional tort remedies fail to meaningfully 
address the problem of invalid policy provisions is simple.  Since 
virtually no one reads their insurance policy—and since even fewer are 
acquainted with case law that makes any given provision 
unenforceable—they never realize that the invalid provision is even 
present.  They do not rely on its presence, or presumptive validity, in 
making any decisions, and they sustain no damage as a result.   
The goal of tort law is to make injured plaintiffs whole for the 
damages they have sustained as a proximate result of the tortious 
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conduct.266  In the case of insurers retaining invalid provisions, those 
remedies will necessarily be based on negligence or some species of 
nondisclosure.  But negligence, nondisclosure, and fraud all require not 
only a breach of duty by the actor, but also that damages proximately 
result from that breach.  The fraud and nondisclosure torts make this 
requirement even more clear by explicitly requiring that the plaintiff 
justifiably rely upon the misstatement.   
Taking the example, then, of an invalid “other owned auto” 
exclusion, the fact is that most insureds will never incur an uninsured or 
underinsured motorist claim while they are operating an auto they own 
that is not covered under the policy.  None of these insureds can have 
legitimate tort claims arising out of presence of the invalid policy 
provision.   
Of those that do have such claims, the overwhelming likelihood is 
that they will not check their policy to see if it is covered, but will 
instead report the claim to the agent or directly to the insurance 
company.  In that case, the insurer will (presumably) investigate, adjust, 
and ultimately pay the claim, despite the presence of the invalid policy 
provision.  Thus, once again, even the insureds who sustain a loss that 
would purportedly be excluded by the invalid provision have no 
damages proximately resulting from its continued presence.   
The only insureds who would have damages proximately resulting 
from the presence of the invalid provision would be those who sustained 
a loss, consulted their policy, read the provisions purporting to bar 
coverage, concluded (incorrectly) that any claim would be barred by the 
provision, and for that reason did not bother to present a claim to their 
insurer.  If any lay insureds have ever gone through this elaborate self-
help process to determine whether they have a covered claim (at least in 
cases involving an invalid policy provision purporting to bar their 
claim), their identities are not ascertainable from any reported case.   
While it seems odd that there would be no tort remedy for the 
knowing inclusion or retention of an invalid policy provision, the tort 
requirements of reliance, proximate cause, and damages would vitiate 
virtually all such claims.  And in cases where a provision was valid 
when the policy was issued, but was later invalidated while the policy 
was in effect, the “filed form” doctrine next described might also serve 
to bar such a claim.   
 
 266. 22 AM JUR. 2D Damages § 28 (2007) (“The sole object of compensatory damages is to 
make the injured party whole for losses actually suffered . . . .”). 
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2.  The Filed Rate/Filed Form Doctrine May Bar Tort Claims 
Another potential bar to relief under any common law theory comes 
in the form of the filed form doctrine.  The filed form doctrine is a 
variant of the more familiar “filed rate” doctrine.   
In many states, insurers are required to file copies of the policies, 
endorsements, riders, and rates that they intend to use.  Ohio is one of 
the states that uses the “file and use” system of form and rate 
regulation.267  Under that form of regulation, a copy of every policy, 
endorsement, rider, manual of classifications, rules, rate, and rating plan 
is filed with the Department of Insurance.268  The filing must state the 
proposed effective date and indicate the character and extent of the 
coverage contemplated.269  Under the Ohio statute, except for special 
situations involving determinations of lack of competition in rates in 
certain lines of insurance, each form becomes effective immediately 
upon its filing and is deemed to comply with the applicable statutory 
requirements, unless explicitly disapproved by the superintendent of 
insurance.270   
This regulatory review and approval of policy forms could well be 
deemed to have the same effect on creating an indisputable presumption 
of correctness and immunity from attack as occurs with filed and 
approved rates and premiums.  That so-called “filed rate doctrine” is 
described at length below.   
a.  The “Filed Rate” Doctrine 
The “filed rate” doctrine—which applies to rates that have been 
filed with and approved by the governing regulatory agency—holds that 
those filed rates are “per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial 
proceedings brought by ratepayers.”271  The filed rate doctrine applies in 
any case where the rate was approved by a federal or state agency.272  
This doctrine has been specifically applied in the insurance context to 
 
 267. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.03(A) (West 2009). 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id.  
 270. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.03(C)(2) (West 2009). 
 271. Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1994).  See also Taffet v. The 
Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1494 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Where the legislature has conferred power 
upon an administrative agency to determine the reasonableness of a rate, the rate-payer can claim no 
rate as a legal right that is other than the filed-rate.”); Office of Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. 
Com., 575 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ohio 1991) (recognizing the “well-established filed rate doctrine”). 
 272. See Taffet, 967 F.2d at 1494 (citing H.J. Inc., v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 
(8th Cir. 1992)). 
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bar private lawsuits that directly or indirectly challenge a premium rate 
which has been filed with and approved by a state department of 
insurance.273   
The filed rate doctrine serves several important objectives.  For 
example, it preserves the exclusive role of regulatory agencies in 
approving rates that are “reasonable” by “keeping courts out of the rate-
making process.”274  Thus, the filed rate doctrine “precludes any judicial 
action which undermines agency rate-making authority.”275   
As the court explained in Prentice v. Title Ins. Co.,276 insurers 
cannot be forced to conform to both the requirements of an insurance 
department and also the whims of a lay jury, because doing so “would 
place insurers in a procrustean bed where one rate must conform to the 
requirements of both the Insurance Commissioner and a trier of fact.”277   
Many courts have applied the filed rate doctrine to preclude class 
actions asserting that the premiums assessed were excessive and seeking 
a return or refund of the “excess” premium.  For example, in N.C. Steel, 
Inc. v. National Council on Compensation Ins.,278 a group of employers 
filed suit against their workers’ compensation insurers alleging that the 
insurers engaged in actions that resulted in higher workers’ 
compensation premiums.279  In North Carolina, the process of rate 
making was commenced by an insurer’s filing of its rates with the 
 
 273. See, e.g., Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 
1503, 1512 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996); accord Kirksey v. Amer. Bankers 
Ins. Co. of Fla., 114 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Prentice v. Title Ins. Co., 500 N.W.2d 
658, 662-64 (Wis. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1114 (1994); Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, 
Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418, 1426 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Wells, 819 So.2d 1196, 
1203-04 (Miss. 2001); Kentucky v. Anthem Ins., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48, 52-53 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); 
N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 372 (N.C. 1998); Byan v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 242 A.D.2d 456, 456 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. LR-C-93-717, 1994 WL 823554 at *6 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 12, 1994); Fersco v. 
Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.Y., No. 93-Civ-42226, 1994 WL 445730 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
17, 1994); Anzinger v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Ins. Exch., 494 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ill. Ct. App 
1986); Banks v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 912 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Miss. 2005). 
 274. Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 275. Katz v. MCI Tel. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 271, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); see also McGuire v. 
Ameritech Servs., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1012 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (“There are no allegations that 
the Telephone Defendants are not providing rates or services in conformity with their filed 
schedules and rates and the like, only that they are not providing services in conformity with such 
rates and terms to Plaintiffs’ liking.”); Kutner v. Sprint Communications Co., 971 F. Supp. 302, 
305-06 (W.D. Tenn. 1997) (holding that the filed rate doctrine prohibits courts from ordering relief 
that would contravene the filed rate).   
 276. 500 N.W.2d 658 (Wis. 1993), cert denied 510 U.S. 1114 (1994). 
 277. Id. at 663. 
 278. 496 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. 1998). 
 279. Id. at 371. 
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Department of Insurance.280  The proposed rates become legal rates 
unless and until the insurance commissioner rules otherwise.281   
The defendant insurers in N.C. Steel charged the premium rates that 
had been filed with the Department of Insurance.282  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court held that because the General Assembly had given the 
insurance commissioner the duty to set rates, those rates could not be 
collaterally attacked by the insureds in a lawsuit.283  In so holding, the 
Court adopted the filed rate doctrine, which had stemmed from the 
United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. 
Co.284  The N.C. Steel Court held that “a plaintiff may not claim 
damages on the grounds that a rate approved by regulator as reasonable 
is nonetheless excessive because it is the product of unlawful 
conduct.”285  Because the North Carolina General Assembly had given 
the insurance commissioner the power and duty to set rates, and because 
the commissioner had the proper expertise to do so, the N.C. Steel Court 
held that the filed rate doctrine prohibited the plaintiffs from collaterally 
challenging the insurer’s use of rates that had been approved by the 
insurance commissioner.286   
Again, in Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,287 the insureds 
brought a class action against a property insurer to recover refunds of 
homeowners and farm insurance policy surcharges, which the insureds 
alleged were improperly based on the age of a dwelling.288  The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the filed rate doctrine barred any 
suit seeking a return of premiums.289  On further appeal, the Minnesota 
 
 280. Id.  
 281. Id.  
 282. Id. at 372. 
 283. Id.  
 284. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).  See N.C. Steel, 496 S.E.2d at 372. 
 285. N.C. Steel, 496 S.E.2d at 372. 
 286. Id. (“We agree with the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in its opinion that we 
should adopt the filed rate doctrine.  The General Assembly has given the Insurance Commissioner 
the duty of setting rates. The Commissioner, aided by his staff, has the expertise to determine proper 
rates.  We do not believe that, by the enactment of N.C.G.S. ch. 75, the General Assembly intended 
that duly set rates be challenged in another forum.  When the Commissioner approved the rates, 
they became the proper rates.  As Judge Wynn, writing for the Court of Appeals, points out, chapter 
58 of the General Statutes contains a comprehensive regulatory scheme for insurance companies, 
which includes provisions for punishing violators of the chapter.  N.C.G.S. § 58-2-70(g) (1994).  It 
also contains a provision for the appeal of decisions of the Commissioner.  N.C.G.S. § 58-2-75(a) 
(1994).  We do not believe that, with this comprehensive regulatory scheme, the General Assembly 
intended that the rates could be collaterally attacked.”). 
 287. 702 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006). 
 288. Id. at 902. 
 289. Id. at 908. 
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Supreme Court affirmed.290  In doing so, it held that certain aspects of 
the ratemaking function, such as the allocation of rates among classes of 
customers, are legislative in nature.291  It held that permitting the rates to 
be challenged by class actions would “interfere with the regulatory 
scheme established by the legislature and with the rate making 
functions” of the department of insurance.292  From the standpoint of 
separation of powers, comity, and justiciability, the Court concluded that 
it could not permit plaintiffs in a class action suit to challenge rates 
approved by the department of insurance in a “file and use” system.293   
The filed rate doctrine has been applied in the specific context of 
suits alleging that the insurer committed fraud in charging the filed rates 
to its insureds.  In Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,294 the insureds 
brought suit against a health insurer to challenge increases in 
premiums.295  They alleged that the manner in which the insurer 
calculated premiums charged to an insured constituted a breach of 
contract, a violation of the insurance code, a violation of two consumer 
acts, and the tort of fraudulent concealment.296  The trial court granted 
the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, and invoked, inter alia, the 
filed rate doctrine.297  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that it is not 
the nature of the relief—nor the name of the cause of action—which 
triggers the application of the filed rate doctrine.298  Because the 
damages sought by the plaintiff would require the court to ascertain the 
correct rate, summary judgment was appropriate.299   
b.  The “Filed Form” Doctrine 
With respect to invalid policy provisions (especially those that have 
been invalidated after they were filed and approved by the regulatory 
authority), insurers may contend that they are protected from tort 
liability under a special variation of the filed rate doctrine that applies to 
policy forms.  This doctrine—while only mentioned in a handful of 
cases—is generally referred to as the “filed form” doctrine.   
 
 290. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, 721 N.W.2d 307, 319 (Minn. 2006). 
 291. Id. at 315. 
 292. Id. at 314. 
 293. Id. at 314-15. 
 294. 745 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001). 
 295. Id. at 593. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 605. 
 299. Id. 
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The “filed form” doctrine seems to have had its beginnings in the 
early twentieth century, when a number of state court decisions held that 
an insurance commissioner’s approval of a policy form was, at the very 
minimum, entitled to “great weight” in terms of whether the policy form 
met all applicable state law requirements.  Some decisions (most notably 
those in Wisconsin) went so far to say that the insurance commissioner’s 
approval was conclusive on the issue of whether the policy met state law 
requirements.300  Even today, some authorities hold that “the approval or 
disapproval of the insurance board or official of the form of a policy is 
binding upon the courts.”301   
The Texas case of Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Wilson 
Motor Co., Inc.302 is typical.  In that case, the insurer failed to include a 
provision required by statute that would permit an insured, on default in 
payment of premiums, to apply the cash value of the policy to the 
balance due.303  The insured argued that because that mandatory 
provision was omitted, it should be read into the policy by operation of 
law.304  The court refused to find that the policy form violated the 
statute, in large part because it was the insurance commissioner’s duty 
under the law to see that the requirements of the statutes were complied 
with in all policies placed upon the market.305  The court concluded that 
since the policy had been filed and approved nearly a decade earlier, the 
commissioner’s “approval of the policy form used in this case involved 
an administrative ruling that the same met affirmatively every 
requirement of said article.”306  The court concluded that “public policy 
requires the solving of mere doubts concerning its proper construction in 
harmony with the construction placed thereon by the officers of the 
department charged with its enforcement.”307   
Over time, this doctrine has evolved into what is sometimes 
referred to as the “filed form doctrine.”  The notion behind the filed form 
doctrine was explained in a 2002 decision from the Southern District of 
 
 300. Berry v. Merchants’ Life & Cas. Co., 195 N.W. 335, 336 (Wis. 1923) (“The construction 
given by the insurance commissioner is certainly a permissible one and under the Lundberg Case is 
conclusive.”).  Early cases addressing this issue are collected in Validity, Construction, and Effect of 
Approval or Disapproval By Insurance Commissioner (or Similar Official) of Form of Policy, 119 
A.L.R. 877 (1939). 
 301. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 33 (2008) (citing Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York v. 
Wilson Motor Co., 75 S.W2d 721 (Tex. Ct. App. 1934) and Berry, 195 N.W. 335). 
 302. 75 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Ct. App. 1934). 
 303. Id. at 722. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 723. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
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New York.  In AMEX Assurance Co. v. Caripides,308 the plaintiff 
attacked a substantive aspect of a policy form that had been filed and 
approved by Fredric Bodner, the then-Chief of the Health and Life 
Policy Bureau of the New York State Insurance Department.309  The 
plaintiffs obtained an affidavit from Mr. Bodner in which he expressed 
the opinion that the insurer apparently “made a mistake” in making the 
default beneficiary class “dependent children” in its policy form, rather 
than merely “children.”310  In his affidavit, Bodner stated that if he had 
been aware that the default beneficiary provision contained the 
“dependent” children limitation, he would have asked the attorney 
reviewing the policy to notify AMEX of the inconsistent use of the term 
“dependent children” and suggest that AMEX correct it so as to make it 
consistent with the requirements of the New York insurance statutes.311   
The court found this insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as 
to the enforceability of the provision.312  The court noted that Bodner 
had not said that the policy would not have been approved as submitted, 
nor did he explain how any portion of the New York statute renders the 
policy unenforceable as submitted and approved.313  Because the form 
had been approved for use by the Insurance Department, the policy form 
was held to be unassailable.314   
The Supreme Court of Mississippi also at least implicitly approved 
both the filed rate and filed form doctrines in American Bankers’ Ins. 
 
 308. 179 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D. N.Y. 2002). 
 309. Id. at 318-19. 
 310. Id. at 319. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 320. 
 313. Id. at 319-20. 
 314. The court said: 
Even assuming that what Mr. Bodner would have done has any bearing on the instant 
litigation, Mr. Bodner fails to aver that he would not have approved the AX0910 policy 
as submitted by AMEX.  Moreover, Mr. Bodner fails to explain how sections 3221 and 
4235(e) of New York Insurance Law render the AX0910 policy unenforceable as 
submitted and approved.  The court can fathom no way in which they do. 
Id. at 319-20.  The court continued: 
The court notes that a line of cases on the ‘filed rate doctrine’ suggests that the Insurance 
Department’s review and approval of a policy is presumptively valid and cannot be 
subsequently judicially challenged as unfair or violative of public policy.  Courts 
normally ‘defer to constructions of statutes by executive branch officials charged with 
their administration,’ and a judicial challenge to the Insurance Department’s approval of 
the AX0910 policy can only be maintained if the policy ‘runs counter to the legislative 
intent or if it violates existing law.’  As indicated below, Cristina has failed to 
demonstrate that the AX0910 policy runs counter to legislative intent or violates existing 
law. 
Id. at FN5. 
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Co. of Florida v. Wells.315  In that case, certain borrowers brought an 
action against a secured lender and the collateral protection insurer to 
recover for breach of contract, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duties, 
fraud, civil conspiracy, and negligence in connection with the forced 
placement of insurance.316  The trial court entered judgment on a jury 
verdict for the borrowers.317  On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case.318  In doing so, 
it held that the filed rate doctrine (and at least implicitly, the filed form 
doctrine) barred claims to recover for excessive premiums.319  The Court 
explained that the filed rate doctrine protected the insurer from collateral 
attack by the plaintiffs with respect to both the rates and the terms of the 
policy.320   
 
 315. 819 So. 2d 1196 (Miss. 2001). 
 316. Id. at 1200. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 1211. 
 319. Id. at 1210-11. 
 320. The court’s explanation is worth repeating at length: 
  Fidelity and American Bankers next argue that the allegations in Wells’s and 
Oliver’s complaints are barred by the filed rate doctrine.  Under the filed rate doctrine, 
any ‘filed rate’ – that is, a rate approved by the governing regulatory agency – is ‘per se 
reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.’ 
 
The filed rate doctrine is based upon sound considerations of law and judicial policy.  A 
civil juror, who likely has little, if any, expertise in the area of insurance rates and 
policies, should not be permitted to reject and thereupon impose liability based on the 
rates of a policy which was expressly approved by the Department of Insurance.  See 
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 83-1-1 et seq. (1999).  Permitting a jury to impose liability in such 
circumstances would result in a judicial infringement upon the duties and responsibilities 
which are expressly delegated by the Legislature to the Department of Insurance.  Id.
   
A plaintiff might have a valid cause of action against his lender for a breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing if it could be shown that the lender engaged in bad faith 
conduct in the performance of a contract approved by the Department of Insurance, 
rather than in the actual rates of such a policy.  However, one of the central allegations of 
this action is that Fidelity obtained a CPI policy under which the rates were too high and 
the provisions were slanted in favor of Fidelity.  Clearly, Wells and Oliver would have 
claimed less damages if the CPI policy contained lower rates, but the Department of 
Insurance, in the exercise of its discretion, opted to approve the rates and policy in 
question. 
   
Although some jurisdictions have recognized exceptions to the filed rate doctrine, the 
acceptance of the doctrine’s basic applicability is near-universal.  At the same time, 
Wells and Oliver do make allegations which are arguably outside of the scope of the 
filed rate doctrine. 
 
We remand this case to the trial court for a new trial with directions that Wells and 
Oliver be limited to recovery for damages (if any) resulting from tortious conduct in the 
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Only one court appears to have explicitly rejected the filed form 
doctrine, and it did so with virtually no explanation.  In Southern Farm 
Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Banko,321 the plaintiff insurer filed an 
interpleader to resolve a dispute over who should receive the proceeds of 
a life insurance policy.322  One of the defendants brought a counterclaim 
alleging that the insurer was negligent in describing the procedures 
necessary for the decedent to effectuate a change of beneficiary.323  The 
insurer filed a motion to dismiss, based on the filed form doctrine.324  In 
a single paragraph, the court rejected the insurer’s argument that the 
counterclaim was barred by the filed form doctrine.325   
If insurance rates and premiums are unassailable by plaintiffs by 
dint of approval by a regulator having special expertise, then the same 
argument should apply with equal force to the protection of forms that 
have been reviewed and approved. 
B.  Current Statutory Remedies 
1.  NAIC Model Unfair Trade Practices Act 
Every state except Mississippi has adopted some form of an unfair 
insurance practices act.326  The purpose of these acts is to reduce the 
incidence of abusive practices by insurers and insurance adjusters.327  
These statutes and regulatory schemes are generally derived from the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) model 
Unfair Trade Practices Act (and in some instances, to the later model 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act).328   
 
performance, rather than the rates and terms, of the contract in question. 
819 So. 2d at 1203-05. 
 321. No. 8:06CV840T27EAJ, 2006 WL 2935281 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2006). 
 322. Id. at *1. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at *2 (“Plaintiff first argues that the claim should be dismissed under the ‘filed form 
doctrine.’  Under federal law, the ‘filed rate doctrine’ ‘forbids a regulated entity to charge rates for 
its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority.’  
Plaintiff has cited one case in which this doctrine was extended to title insurance premiums.  
However, there is, as Plaintiff concedes, no ‘filed form doctrine’ under Florida law.  Nor has 
Plaintiff cited any case that indicates that regulatory approval of an insurance policy form bars suits 
over policy language.”). 
 326. James P. Diwik, A State by State Survey of Unfair Insurance Practices Regulations, in 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE FIDELITY AND SURETY DESK REFERENCE BOOK 33 (DeWitte 
Thompson ed. 2006). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 35. 
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The version followed by most states is the 1972 NAIC model 
statute, the full name of which is “An Act Relating to Unfair Methods of 
Competition and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in the 
Business of Insurance.”329  The legislative history to this Act notes that 
the market conduct taskforce recommended changing the title to “Unfair 
Trade Practices Act” (UTPA).330  There was no intent that this change 
should apply any change in concept.331   
This change was made in 1990, when provisions relating to claims 
settlement practices were deleted from the UTPA and incorporated into a 
free-standing model statute known as the Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Act.332  The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act is not 
relevant to the present inquiry, since it is directed solely to the handling 
of claims once they have been presented.   
The UTPA as promulgated by the NAIC in 1972 has been enacted 
without substantial change in approximately 45 states.333  In the model 
act, the NAIC took the position in the model act that no private cause of 
action could be based on the violation of its provisions.334  Because 
states have adopted various versions of this Act and the Uniform Claims 
Settlement Practices Act, the exclusion of a private cause of action under 
these statutes is not universally implemented or recognized.335   
The majority view (held by courts in at least 21 of the 26 
jurisdictions that have examined the question) is that no cause of action 
can be implied from these Acts, regardless of whether the action is 
brought by a third party or by the insured and regardless of whether the 
policy provides first party or liability coverage.336  Some states, such as 
 
 329. National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Laws, Regulations and 
Guidelines 880-1 (2007). 
 330. Id.  
 331. Id. 
 332. National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Laws, Regulations and 
Guidelines 880-1, legislative history (2007). 
 333. DENNIS J. WALL, LITIGATION AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH § 7.05, 299 (2d 
ed. 1994).  The Statement of Purpose to the Unfair Trade Practices Act says the purpose is of the 
Act is “to regulate trade practices in the business of insurance in accordance with the intent of 
Congress as expressed in the Act of Congress of March 9, 1945 (Public Law 15, 79th Congress) and 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Public Law 106-102, 106th Congress), by defining, or providing for 
the determination of, all such practices in this state that constitute unfair methods of competition or 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined.  
Nothing herein shall be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a violation of this 
Act.”  National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Laws, Regulations and 
Guidelines 880-1, § 1 (2007). 
 334. Diwik, supra note 326, at 47. 
 335. Id. 
 336. WALL, supra note 333, § 7.06, 305. 
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California, once recognized a cause of action based on the violation of 
the statute.337  However, the California Supreme Court later reversed its 
position and prospectively denied the cause of action based upon 
violation of the statute.338  Thus, a majority of states have held that the 
two NAIC model unfair insurance practices Acts do not recognize a 
private cause of action for their breach.339   
But even in those few states that permit a private cause of action 
based upon a violation of the UTPA, it would be exceedingly difficult to 
make a case.  This is in part because the model UTPA states that it is an 
unfair trade practice for an insurer to commit one of the 16 offenses 
specified in Section 4 of the Act only if the offense is 1) committed 
flagrantly and in conscious disregard of the Act or any rules 
promulgated thereunder; or 2) committed with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice to engage in that type of conduct.340 
Many states, such as Ohio, further limit this definition.  Under 
Ohio’s version of the UTPA (which was promulgated as an 
administrative regulation rather than as a statute), the definition of an 
unfair trade practice is limited to those instances where the offense is 
committed so frequently as to indicate a general business practice.341  It 
is not sufficient for it to have been committed “flagrantly and in 
conscious disregard” of the provisions of the Act.342 
 
 337. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Butte County, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979). 
 338. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 68-69 (Cal. 1988) (“[C]ourts 
retain jurisdiction to impose civil damages or other remedies against insurers in appropriate 
common law actions, based on such traditional theories as fraud, infliction of emotional distress, 
and (as to the insured) either breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.”). 
 339. A minority of states do permit such a claim .  See Diwik, supra note 326, at 48. 
 340. Improper Termination Practices Model Act, National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) 915-1, § 18(A) (2007). 
 341. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3901:1-07(C) (2009). 
 342. Ohio courts have consistently held that violations of the UTPA and the Uniform 
Property/Casualty Claims Settlement Practices Act (OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3901:1-54 (2009)) do not 
give right to a private cause of action.  Furr v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 716 N.E.2d 250, 257 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that neither Ohio Admin. Code 3901-1-07 nor 3901-1-54 give right 
to a private cause of action for violations of those rule); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. 
& Surety Co., No. 16993, 1995 WL 422733 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 12, 1995), appeal not allowed 
657 N.E.2d 785 (Ohio 1995) (“If the IRB’s conduct constituted a violation of the statutory and 
administrative laws, as alleged, the violations alone do not give rise to a policyholder’s private right 
of action.”); Orra v. Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Assn., No. L-87-233, 1988 WL 36380 at *2 (Ohio 
Ct. App. March 31, 1988) (“Although appellant lists certain factors which he claims constitutes 
unfair trade practices pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3901 and regulations promulgated thereunder, 
‘[n]owhere in the Ohio statutory or regulatory framework proscribing deceptive trade practices in 
insurance does it provide a civil remedy to a private party aggrieved by an insurer.’”); Griffith v. 
Buckeye Union Ins. Co., No. 86AP-1063, 1987 WL 17805 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1987) 
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In 1989, the NAIC subgroup that was considering amendments to 
the UTPA discussed whether a private cause of action for UTPA 
violations was or should be permitted.343  The subgroup determined that 
no private cause of action was intended, and added draft language to that 
affect.344  The amendment adopted in 1990 included a new final sentence 
to Section 1 to clarify the NAIC’s position on that issue.345  Indeed, the 
drafting note that accompanied the 1990 revision stated that: 
A jurisdiction choosing to provide a private cause of action should 
consider a different statutory scheme.  This Act is inherently 
inconsistent with a private cause of action.  This is merely a 
clarification of original intent and not indicative of any change of 
position.346   
This determination should not have come as a surprise to anyone.  
A decade earlier, in 1980, an NAIC report unequivocally stated that the 
model UTPA was not designed to create a private right of action.347   
In proving that an unfair act has been committed or performed 
“with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice,” the 
courts have typically required evidence that the insurer committed 
repeated acts of misconduct, generally in cases other than the one 
involving the plaintiff.348  This presents an obvious—and perhaps 
 
(“The Ohio Department of Insurance rules . . . do not create a private cause of action, but are 
regulatory in nature.  Thus, the rules cannot be considered evidence of the applicable standard of 
bad faith.”); Kimpel v. Dairy Farm Leasing Co., Inc., No. WMS-86-8, 1987 WL 5310 at *1 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1987) (“R.C. § 3901.21 and Ohio Admin. Code 3901-1-07 did not give appellants a 
private right of action against appellee for alleged unfair practices.”); Strack v. Westfield Cos., 515 
N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (“This court finds that the inference of a private cause of 
action would be inconsistent with the existing administrative enforcement scheme now in force.  
Supplying a tort remedy will not necessarily further the policy behind Ohio Adm. Code 3901-1-
07.”). 
 343. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) 900-1, legislative history. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Unfair Trade Practices Act, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
880-1, § 1 (“Nothing herein shall be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for a 
violation of this Act.”). 
 346. Third Party Causes of Action: Effects on West Virginia Insurance Markets at 12 (Office 
of Ins. Comm’r Feb. 2005), available at http://www.wvinsurance.gov/reports/pdf/third_ 
party_causes_action_effects.pdf. 
 347. Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Market Conduct, 
Examination and Reporting (B) Committee, 1980-2 NAIC Proc. 339, 350 (1980) (“In any event, the 
intent of the NAIC, as evidenced by the language of the Model [Act] and the NAIC Proceedings, 
and supplemented by this Report, was clearly not to create a new private right of action for trade 
practices which are prohibited by the Model Act.”).   
 348. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Ark. 1984); 
Mead v. Burns, 509 A.2d 11, 16 (Conn. 1986); Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 613 A.2d 838, 
55
Tucker: Disappearing Ink
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
11-TUCKER_PUB_EDITS.DOC 4/14/2009  1:27 PM 
574 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:519 
insurmountable—difficulty in cases involving the inclusion or retention 
of invalid policy provisions.  If the claimant cannot prove that the 
insurer has knowingly included or retained policy provisions on other 
occasions, then the cause of action cannot be established.  Finally, it is 
by no means clear that the inclusion or retention of an invalid provision 
would constitute an unfair trade practice as defined in Section 4 of the 
UTPA.349   
Subsection 1 of Section 4 appears to be addressed to advertising or 
promotional literature, rather than to the terms of the policies 
themselves.  In any event, even if a policy includes invalid provisions, it 
may be difficult to say that the policy language “misrepresents the . . . 
terms of any insurance policy.”350  Likewise, subsection 2 of Section 4 
makes it improper to provide false information in advertising 
generally.351   
While this subsection provides plenty of ambiguity due to its 
inartful drafting, it ultimately prohibits misstatements limited to “the 
business of insurance or with respect to any person in the conduct of his 
 
840 (Conn. Ct. App. 1992); Howell-Demarest v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 526, 
528 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996); Trempe v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 480 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Mass. Ct. App. 
1985); United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Johnson & Lindberg, P.A., 617 F. Supp. 968, 976 (D. 
Minn. 1985); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. McAllister, 785 F. Supp. 119, 121 (D. Mont. 1990), 
judgment aff’d 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Cumiskey. 665 
P.2d 223, 226 (Mont. 1983); Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (N.Y. 1983); 
Miller v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.E.2d 537, 542-43 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Dvorak v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 332 (N.D. 1993); Turner Const. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. 
Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 752, 763 (E.D. Pa. 1993), judgment aff’d 22 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 1994); Jerry v. 
Kentucky Cent. Ins. Co., 836 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. 
Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 259-60 (W. Va. 1981), overruled on other grounds by, State ex rel. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1994); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. 
Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 268 n.3 (Wis. 1981). 
 349. Subsection 1 of Section 4 prohibits insurers from “[m]aking, issuing, circulating, or 
causing to be made, issued, or circulated, any estimate, illustrations, circular or, statement, sales 
presentation, omission, or comparison which . . . (a) misrepresents the . . . conditions or terms of 
any insurance policy . . . .”  1972-1 NAIC Proc. 490, 493-94 (1971). 
 350. Id. 
 351. This subsection prohibits:  
Making, publishing, disseminating, circulating or placing before the public, or causing, 
directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before 
the public, in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the form of a notice, 
circular, pamphlet, letter or poster or over any radio or television station, or in any other 
way, an advertisement, announcement, or statement containing any assertion, 
representation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or with respect to 
any person in the conduct of his insurance business, which is untrue, deceptive or 
misleading. 
Id. at 494. 
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insurance business.”352  Again, it is unlikely that a policy constitutes 
advertising under this section, and it is even less likely that an 
unenforceable policy provision would be tantamount to a statement 
“with respect to the business of insurance or with respect to any person 
in the conduct of his insurance business.”353   
None of the other subsections of Section 4 of the UTPA are likely 
candidates for providing even an implied cause of action based upon the 
presence of an invalid policy provision.  Thus, the UTPA is an unlikely 
source of relief for a person aggrieved by the inclusion or retention of an 
invalid provision in his or her policy.   
2.  State Law Consumer Sales Practices Act 
In some cases, plaintiffs have brought suits claiming that insurers’ 
unfair claims settlement practices violated various state consumer 
protection statutes.  As one commentator has observed, because these 
statutes vary so greatly, “one cannot generalize about whether consumer 
protection statutes apply to insurance cases.”354  That determination 
“normally turns on . . . whether insurance constitutes ‘goods’ or 
‘services’ and whether the plaintiff is a ‘consumer’ within the meaning 
of the statute.”355   
A 2007 California court of appeals decision is instructive.  Like 
most states, California does not recognize a private cause of action for 
an insurer’s violation of the statutes governing insurance.  For that 
reason, in Fairbanks v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,356 the 
plaintiffs brought an action under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act 
(CLRA), which allows a private right of action against providers of 
goods and services.357  The insured purchased a life insurance policy 
from an insurer and was told that it would remain in effect indefinitely if 
she paid a stated premium.358  In point of fact, this amount was 
insufficient to keep the policy in force to maturity.359  The plaintiff 
brought a class action suit alleging unfair and deceptive practices under 
 
 352. Id.  
 353. Id. 
 354. ASHLEY, supra note 257, at § 9:16 and cases cited therein. 
 355. Id. 
 356. 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), review granted, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273 (Cal. 
2007). 
 357. Id. at 625. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
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the CLRA.360  The insurer filed a motion to dismiss—which the trial 
court granted—on the grounds that insurance was not a “good” or 
“service” within the meaning of the statute.361  The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that insurance is not a good because it is not tangible, 
and that it is not a service because it is neither “work” nor “labor” nor a 
“personal service” such as a haircut.362   
The vagaries of the state consumer protection statutes have also 
been noted in the American Law Reports Annotation titled Coverage of 
Insurance Transactions under State Consumer Protection Statues.363  In 
summarizing the irreconcilable decisions on the subject, the author of 
that Annotation concluded that the availability of a remedy under state 
consumer protection statutes must inherently be made on a case and 
jurisdiction-specific basis.364  Thus, in many if not most cases, there is 
no meaningful statutory remedy for the inclusion or retention of invalid 
policy provisions based on state consumer sales practices statutes.   
C.  Current Administrative Remedies 
1.  There is No Meaningful Administrative Review of Policy 
Provisions 
Both rates and forms are subject to state regulation.  However, the 
actual extent of review varies widely from state to state.  There are seven 
types of statutory form review systems.365  They are: 
 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 626-27 (“The plain language of the CLRA indicates that insurance is not a ‘good.’  
‘Goods’ are defined as tangible chattels bought or leased for personal, family or household use.  
(Civ.Code, § 1761, subd. (a).)  Insurance is not a tangible item.  Thus it cannot be a ‘good.’  It 
follows that the pertinent issue here is whether insurance can be considered a “service” under the 
CLRA.  The CLRA defines ‘Services’ as ‘work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or 
business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods.’  (Civ. 
Code, § 1761, subd. (b)).  Insurance, in contrast, is defined by the Insurance Code as ‘a contract, 
whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a 
contingent or unknown event.’  (Ins. Code, § 22).  Obviously, insurance contracts are not work or 
labor.  Nor can these indemnification agreements easily be described as personal services or 
services ‘furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods.’  An insurance contract is not 
something akin to a haircut, a plumbing repair, or a two-year warranty on a microwave oven—it is 
simply an agreement to pay if and when an identifiable event occurs. . . . Thus, insurance does not 
appear to be a service under within the plain meaning of the language of the CLRA.”). 
 363. Brian H. Redmond, Coverage of Insurance Transactions Under State Consumer 
Protection Statutes, 77 A.L.R. 4th 991 (1989). 
 364. See id. at § 2[a]. 
 365. American Insurance Association, State Rate and Form Law Guide (2006). 
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1) State adopted forms—the legislature or other regulatory 
authority provides the wording of the form to be used by insurers; 
2) Strict prior approval—the regulator is required to approve forms 
prior to  their use; 
3) Prior approval with an express deemer—forms must be filed 
with the regulator, but may be used if the regulator does not disapprove 
within a specified waiting period; 
4) File and use—requires forms to be filed before or on the 
proposed effective date, and the forms ordinarily become effective as 
proposed unless the regulator takes affirmative action to the contrary; 
5) Use and file—the insurer is permitted to develop and use forms, 
with the only requirement that the form be filed a specified number of 
days after the effective date; 
6) Form filing only—the insurers must file their forms, but the 
statutes do not specify when they must be filed; and 
7) No form filing—no filing of policy forms is necessary366 
The form review system can vary by the type of insurance, even 
within a single state.367  Personal lines policies are often subject to 
higher standards of review than commercial lines policies. 
But even with personal lines insurance, it is a rare occurrence for a 
regulator to actually read a proposed form before it goes into effect.  In 
the case of private passenger automobile insurance, only one state has a 
“state adopted” policy form, and only two require actual prior 
approval.368  Thirty-six states utilize a “prior approval with express 
deemer” review, nine have a “file and use” review system, one requires 
an informational filing only, and four require no filing at all.369   
Likewise, with respect to homeowner policies, no states have a 
“state adopted” form, and only two require strict prior approval.370  
Thirty-eight states have a “prior approval with express deemer” review 
system, eight have file and use statutes, one requires an informational 
filing only, and four do not require policy forms to be filed at all.371   
Within the last decade, the trend has in fact been towards 
deregulation, where rates and forms are subject to minimal (if any) 
oversight.  While that has particularly been true with respect to 
commercial lines, it is true with respect to personal lines as well.   
 
 366. Id. 
 367. See id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
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In 1998, the NAIC released a White Paper titled Regulatory Re-
engineering of Commercial Lines Insurance, which proposed 
deregulation of rates and forms for large commercial buyers.372  Since 
then, there has been a “rush to deregulate rates and forms.”373  The 
Director of Government Affairs for the Risk and Insurance Management 
Society has been quoted as anticipating an “8 to 10 year effort to chip 
away” at all rate and form filing requirements.374  And the Government 
Affairs Advocate for the National Association of Mutual Insurance 
Companies has observed that “[t]here’s even talk of personal lines 
deregulation.”375  Even the AEI-Bookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies urges deregulation of personal lines forms, claiming that 
“[f]iling should be required, at most, for policy forms sold to small 
business and personal lines customers, and those forms should not be 
subject to prior approval.”376   
More recently, in January 2008, the Connecticut Insurance 
Department exempted certain lines of commercial insurance from the 
form, rate and rule filing provisions.377  In a bulletin issued on January 7, 
2008, the Connecticut Insurance Department adopted a one-year pilot 
program to exempt certain lines of commercial insurance from the form, 
rate and rule filing provisions that would otherwise apply.378  The stated 
purposes of allowing this exemption were “(i) to encourage more 
efficient and economic marketing practices by insurers for these product 
lines; and (ii) to provide price and other information to enable 
consumers to purchase [insurance] suitable for their needs and to foster 
competitive insurance markets.”379  This exemption applies to 13 
specified types of commercial insurance, including garden variety 
commercial forms or commercial inland marine protection, crop and hail 
damage, commercial flood insurance, boiler and machinery insurance, 
commercial policies for certain newly developed coverages including 
computer fraud coverage, all “following form” commercial and excess 
 
 372. Commercial Lines Deregulation Marches Through The States, 24 VIEWPOINT No. 1 
(1999). 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. SCOTT E. HARRINGTON, INSURANCE DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 45 
(2000). 
 377. Exemption of Certain Commercial Lines Property and Casualty Policy Forms, Rates and 
Rules, Conn. Ins. Dept. Bulletin No. PC-63 (January 7, 2008). 
 378. Id.  
 379. Id. 
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umbrella policies, and any other commercial excess and umbrella policy 
if the underlying policy provides at least $1 million of coverage.380   
The general inadequacy of regulatory review of insurer rate and 
form filings (when filings are required at all) has been acknowledged by 
the courts in other contexts.  For example, insurers have sometimes 
asserted that state regulatory oversight provides immunity from antitrust 
liability.  But the federal courts—including the United States Supreme 
Court—have concluded that “file and use” supervision is inadequate to 
justify the grant of immunity, since many of those filings are never 
reviewed at all.  Thus, in Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Ins. 
Co.,381 the Supreme Court held that rates filed with state agencies under 
the “negative option rule” (which is equivalent to a “file and use” 
regulation) were inadequate to justify antitrust immunity.382  The stated 
reason for that conclusion was the clear track record of inadequate 
regulatory review of those filings.383   
As shown above, in many states, there is currently no form review 
mechanism in place at all.  And even in those where there is theoretically 
 
 380. Id. at Appendix A. 
 381. 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 
 382. Id. at 638. 
 383. In its opinion, the Court concluded that, regardless of the potential for regulatory review, 
“active state supervision” simply did not exist:  
Where prices or rates are set as an initial matter by private parties, subject only to a veto 
if the State chooses to exercise it, the party claiming the immunity must show that state 
officials have undertaken the necessary steps to determine the specifics of the price-
fixing or rate setting scheme. 
. . . 
Respondents point out that in Wisconsin and Montana the rating bureaus filed rates with 
state agencies and that in both States the so-called negative option rule prevailed.  The 
rates became effective unless they were rejected within a set time.  It is said that as a 
matter of law in those States inaction signified substantive approval.  This proposition 
cannot be reconciled, however, with the detailed findings, entered by the ALJ and 
adopted by the Commission, which demonstrate that the potential for state supervision 
was not realized in fact.  The ALJ found, and the Commission agreed, that at most the 
rate filings were checked for mathematical accuracy.  Some were unchecked altogether.  
In Montana, a rate filing became effective despite the failure of the rating bureau to 
provide additional requested information.  In Wisconsin, additional information was 
provided after a lapse of seven years, during which time the rate filing remained in 
effect.  These findings are fatal to respondents’ attempts to portray the state regulatory 
regimes as providing the necessary component of active supervision.  The findings 
demonstrate that, whatever the potential for state regulatory review in Wisconsin and 
Montana, active state supervision did not occur.   
Id.  See also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 998 F.2d 1129, 1139 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding on remand that “the Supreme Court plainly instructed us that a state’s rubber stamp is not 
enough.  Active supervision requires the state regulatory authority’s independent review and 
approval.”). 
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a review mechanism in place (as in the use and file, file and use, and 
prior approval with an express deemer jurisdictions), the degree to which 
forms are actually examined could well be called into question.  The 
NAIC published a study in 2002 reviewing the degree to which 
regulators actually engaged in substantive review of rate filings (which 
are subject to a similar array of review systems ranging from rates 
established by the state to no review at all).384  That study found that 
“conventional categories of rate review (such as file and use) are 
ambiguous in practice . . .” and that “[i]n many states, there was a 
disconnect between statutory constraints on insurer rating and the 
Department’s rate review authority or processes.”385  The authors of that 
study observed that, in many states, “the rate review process was either 
much more active or much less active than the statutory category might 
imply.”386  Ultimately, those authors concluded that the diversity in rate 
review practices between the states was “substantial,” and that 
“variations among states in their statutes governing insurer rating 
translate into even greater variation in practice . . . .”387   
While no similar study has been conducted concerning variations in 
form review practices, it would be reasonable to expect similar findings.  
It is unlikely that regulators will catch every instance of an invalid or 
unenforceable policy provision in every filing submitted to them by 
every insurer, and it is unrealistic to expect them to do so.  Further, when 
the court of last resort in a state invalidates a previously-valid policy 
provision, it is wholly unrealistic to expect that the regulator can re-
review every policy filed by every insurer to see whether that provision 
is included in their policy and, if so, to require its removal.   
If public policy favors the removal of invalid provisions from 
insurance policies, then the onus should be placed on the insurers.  And 
if the present trend away from meaningful review of form and 
endorsement filings continues, it is even more important that insurers be 
required to regulate their own conduct by refraining from including 
provisions that are already invalid.  Insurers should be given explicit 
instructions on when and under what circumstances such removal is 
required, coupled with some penalty for failure to do so.  The author’s 
proposed legislation would do precisely that.   
 
 384. Adele M. Kirk & Deborah J. Chollet, State Review of Major Medical Health Insurance 
Rates, 20 J. INS. REG. 3 (2002). 
 385. Id. at 3.  
 386. Id. at 7. 
 387. Id. at 15. 
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2.  Readability Regulations Do Not Address Substantive Content 
The NAIC and state regulators have long attempted to make 
insurance policies both more uniform and more readable.  It was the 
desire for uniformity that led the National Board of Fire Underwriters to 
adopt a standard policy in 1868.388  A revised form, the 1918 New York 
Standard Policy, removed many of the clauses that could render the fire 
insurance voidable by the insurer.389   
In 1943, the NAIC entered the fray and adopted the New York 
Standard Fire Policy.390  Interestingly, some of the language in that 
policy must be ignored for the policy to make sense.  As one 
commentator pointed out, the “control or knowledge” wording in line 32 
of the second page makes the insurance voidable if the insured has 
knowledge of being exposed to a hazardous condition, even though he is 
not in control of it.  Insurers had to pretend that the word “or” in “control 
or knowledge” really read “and” in order to avoid the denial of many 
claims.391   
Regulators began taking an interest in the readability of insurance 
policies in the early 1970s.  In 1971, the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Commissioner began rejecting personal lines policies that were not 
written in simple language.392  Four companies tried and failed to submit 
compliant policies before Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
received approval of its Century II simplified auto policy in 1974.393   
Many readers of this article will be aware of the Flesch test for 
readability because it is one of the key elements of the “Readability 
Statistics” feature used in Microsoft Word.394  What many readers may 
not know is that it was Rudolph Flesch who in 1975 rewrote the St. Paul 
Fire & Marine personal liability catastrophe policy to make it more 
readable.395  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, many states enacted plain 
language acts, which required drafters of standardized form contracts to 
 
 388. Collier, supra note 124, at 80. 
 389. Id.  
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 81. 
 393. Id. 
 394. The Readability Statistics in Microsoft Word are broken down into three categories, those 
being “Counts,” “Averages,” and “Readability.”  The “Counts” section includes word counts, 
character counts, paragraph counts, and sentence counts.  The “Averages” category includes the 
average number of sentences per paragraph, average number of words per sentence, and average 
number of characters per word.  The “Readability” statistics include the percentage of passive 
sentences, the Flesch Reading Ease score, and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level determination.  
 395. Collier, supra note 124, at 81. 
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avoid jargon and specify the obligations of the other party.396  About half 
of the states have enacted such legislation, but in some instances the 
plain language laws are not specific to insurers.397  About 30 states have 
some form of plain language or readability component of their insurance 
laws.398   
The nature of these readability statutes varies greatly.  Some simply 
require that a consumer contract be written “in a clear and coherent 
manner using words with common and everyday meaning” and that it be 
“appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections.”399  Others, 
by contrast, require certain organization, typeface, and limits on words 
or syllables.   
The statutory requirements in Ohio, for example, fall within the 
latter case.400  By statute, all Ohio policy forms must be filed with the 
Department of Insurance before they can be used.  The text of the form 
must achieve a minimum score of 40 on the Flesch reading test or an 
equivalent score on any other comparable test.401  The statute also 
requires that the form be printed in typeface that is at least 10 point in 
size; the style, arrangement, and overall appearance of the policy must 
not give undue prominence to any portion of the text, endorsements or 
riders; and the policy must contain a table of contents or an index if the 
policy is more than 3,000 words or is more than three pages in length.402  
Each filing must be accompanied by a certificate signed by an officer of 
the insurer attesting to the fact that the filing meets the minimum reading 
ease score on the test used.403   
The NAIC has joined in the demand for readability.  In June 1977, 
the NAIC endorsed the standard that car and home policies be written at 
the eighth grade level.404  The National Association of Independent 
Insurers also developed a standard car policy that gets high marks in 
readability tests.  This policy, which is not copyrighted, may be used by 
anyone, which assists insurers in developing a uniform and readable 
policy.405   
 
 396. 1 STEMPEL, supra note 171, at § 2:05[E], 2-75. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. at 2-76. 
 399. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.31 (West 1995), cited in STEMPEL, supra note 171, at 2-75. 
 400. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04 (West 2009). 
 401. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04(A)(1) (West 2009). 
 402. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04(A)(2)-(4) (West 2009). 
 403. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04(D) (West 2009). 
 404. Collier, supra note 124, at 81. 
 405. Id. 
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The NAIC’s continued interest in readability issues is evidenced by 
its current efforts to revise its draft Disclosure Guidelines and 
Process.406  That document not only includes instructions for creating 
readable, plain language documents, but also addresses the presentation 
and content aspects of making the written word understandable.407   
In March 2007, the NAIC promulgated its Standards for Individual 
Disability Income Insurance Application Change Form,408 which also 
addresses readability requirements.409  Specifically, it requires that the 
text of an application change form to achieve a minimum score of 50 on 
the Flesch reading test (or an equivalent score on a comparable test), that 
the text appear in at least 10 point type, and that the form give no undue 
prominence to any text or section.410   
But nothing in these readability rules and regulations addresses 
content.  One insurance commentator has observed that “few if any state 
insurance laws discuss unconscionable contract provisions per se,”411 
and as shown above, no statute, rule, or regulation addresses the 
inclusion or retention of invalid policy provisions.   
Readability is useless unless the text accurately describes the 
coverage provided.  If the NAIC and state regulators insist that policies 
be readable, then they should also insist that the content of the document 
accurately reflect the coverage.  It is simply pointless to make a policy 
readable if the one will nevertheless come away with an incorrect 
understanding of coverage after reading it.   
3.  Regulators Lack the Power to Assess Compensatory or Punitive 
Damages 
It has already been shown that the common law remedies for 
continued inclusion of invalid provisions are inadequate.  While the 
courts have the power to award compensatory and punitive damages, it 
is difficult if not impossible to find a plaintiff who has standing to bring 
 
 406. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Disclosure Guidelines and Process 
(Draft Aug. 17, 2006), available at http://www.lisassociation.org/vlsaamembers 
/files/broker_issues_NAIC_Disclosure_Guidelines_and_ Process_08-17-06.pdf (last accessed Feb. 
26, 2009).   
 407. Id. 
 408. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Standards for Individual Disability 
Income Insurance Application Change Form (Mar. 29, 2007), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_speed_compactstds_app_change_form_disability.p
df (last accessed Feb. 27, 2009). 
 409. Id.  
 410. Id. 
 411. 1 STEMPEL, supra note 171, at § 2.05[F], 2-79. 
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an action complaining of nothing more than an insurer’s inclusion or 
retention of an invalid policy provision.  And even if such a plaintiff is 
identified, it is unlikely that that individual will have sustained any 
damages in reliance upon its continued presence.   
The administrative remedies suffer from similar infirmities.  In 
states where insurers must at least file their policy forms and 
endorsements before they may be used, an aggrieved policyholder can 
request a hearing with respect to a filed policy form, and the insurance 
commissioner can invalidate it.  But that is of little consequence where 
(1) virtually no policyholders bother to read their policy (much less 
ascertain whether its many provisions are valid and enforceable) and (2) 
even if they did, while the insured could request and obtain a hearing on 
the question, the insurance commissioner cannot award compensatory or 
punitive damages or attorney fees.   
Typical of these statutes is the one in Ohio.  Under Ohio law, every 
insurer is required to file with the superintendent of insurance “every 
form of a policy, endorsement, rider, manual of classifications, rules, 
and rates . . . which it proposes to use.”412  Any person aggrieved with 
respect to any filing that is in effect may apply to the superintendent for 
a hearing, specifying the grounds to be relied upon by the applicant.413  
If the superintendent finds that the application is made in good faith, that 
the applicant would be aggrieved if his grounds are established, and that 
the grounds justify holding a hearing, the superintendent must hold a 
hearing within 30 days thereafter as to every insurer and rating 
organization that made the filing.414  If the superintendent, after the 
hearing, finds that the filing does not comply with the Ohio statutes, the 
superintendent must issue an order specifying in what respects he finds 
that the filing fails to comply and stating when, within a reasonable 
period thereafter, the filing will no longer be effective.415   
In addition to the problem of finding an “aggrieved person” with 
standing to bring the claim (and who is aware of the problem), this 
administrative remedy suffers other failings.  First, for the many reasons 
discussed above (including the fact that no statute forbids the inclusion 
or retention of an invalid policy provision) it is not clear that such a 
policy would “not comply with [the specified sections] of the Revised 
Code . . . .”416  Moreover, an individual policyholder has little incentive 
 
 412. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.03(A) (West 2009). 
 413. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.04(B) (West 2009). 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
 416. See id. 
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to bring such a claim where the administrative remedy does not permit 
an award of compensatory or punitive damages or attorney fees.  And it 
is clear that those remedies are not available.   
In Ohio, the superintendent of insurance “has jurisdiction over a 
simple breach of contract case and portions of the remaining non-
negligence claims, but only to the extent of ordering reimbursement of 
wrongly charged moneys.”417  The same court noted that “this authority 
does not extend to awarding attorney, auditor, or accountant fees, 
compensatory or punitive damages, or costs . . . .”418   
The case law in other jurisdictions is to the same effect.  For 
example, in Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co.,419 the insured 
employee and his daughter sued on a group health policy for medical 
and hospital expenses the daughter incurred as a result of injuries 
sustained in a one-car accident.420  The trial court granted summary 
judgment to the insurer on several grounds, including the ground that the 
plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.421   
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed.422  In the portion of its 
opinion addressing the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court 
held that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to exhaust those remedies 
since the insurance commissioner lacked the authority to grant the 
requested damages.423   
 
 417. Lazarus v. Ohio Cas. Group, 761 N.E.2d 649, 654 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). 
 418. Id.  Other Ohio authorities are to the same effect.  See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Northern Ohio, No. 50266, 1986 WL 7714 at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. July 
10, 1986) (“The Superintendent . . . lacked authority to adjudicate the hospital’s claim for 
damages.”); Barnes v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 1:06CV574, 2006 WL 2265553 at *4 (N.D. 
Ohio Aug. 8, 2006) (“As the Complaint seeks damages outside the scope of the Superintendent’s 
authority, this Court does not find that referral to the Superintendent for the breach of contract and 
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claims would contribute to the meaningful resolution 
of the suit.”); Chesner v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 1:06CV476, 2006 WL 2252542 at *4 (N.D. 
Ohio Aug. 4, 2006). 
 419. 442 A.2d 920 (Conn. 1982). 
 420. Id. at 921. 
 421. Id. at 922. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. at 925-26.  Authorities to the same effect from other jurisdictions abound.  See, e.g., 
Ambassador Ins. Corp. v. Feldman, 598 P.2d 630, 631 (Nev. 1979) (“The Insurance Commissioner 
is without authority to award damages caused by defamation; the commissioner’s powers are 
limited to the regulation of insurance trade practices.”); Shernoff v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (“Appellant’s complaint seeks damages, and 
Insurance Code section 790.09 provides specifically that the Commissioner’s action cannot relieve 
or absolve the insurer from such a claim.”); Irvin v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., No. 00-2716, 2001 WL 
246408 at *2 (E.D. La. March 12, 2001) (“Here, the remedies plaintiffs seek include damages, 
which the Louisiana Department of Insurance cannot provide.”); Ass’n Cas. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. 
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Indeed, in the one case directly addressing the question where an 
insured brought suit against the health insurer alleging that the “other 
insurance” provision violated public policy, the court expressly held that 
the insurance commissioner lacked any authority to adjudicate the 
policyholder’s claim.424   
Clearly, the administrative remedies now in place are not sufficient 
to address the problem of insurer retention of invalid policy provisions, 
even in the extremely unusual case where a policyholder may be aware 
of, and decides to challenge, the continued presence of such a provision.   
D.  The NAIC Draft “Property and Casualty Rate and Policy Form Best 
Practices” Provisions Also Fail to Address the Problem.  
The NAIC is presently working on a discussion draft of a document 
known as the Property and Casualty Rate and Policy Form Best 
Practices.425  Its stated purpose is to, inter alia, “regulate insurance 
contracts to the end that they not be contrary to the laws of the state, 
misleading, illusory, ambiguous, deceptive, contrary to public policy, 
unreasonably restrictive, or likely to mislead or deceive the policyholder 
. . . .”426   
As currently constituted, Section 8 of the draft addresses Policy 
Form Standards.  Subsection A of that proposed draft provides as 
follows: 
A. Policy forms shall not: 
(1)  Contain provisions, exceptions or conditions that are misleading, 
illusory, inconsistent, ambiguous, deceptive, or contrary to public 
policy, that unreasonably affect the risk  purported to be assumed in the 
general coverage of the policy, or that encourage misrepresentation of 
the coverage; or 
(2)  Violate or fail to comply with any provision of the insurance code 
or the laws of this state.427 
 
Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (“[N]either the Board nor the Commissioner have 
the authority to grant monetary damages under the administrative remedy provided . . . .”). 
 424. Hazelett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ind., 400 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1980) (“There is no hint of establishing any type of administrative remedy for policyholders.  In fact 
they are not mentioned.  The Statute is limited to providing the manner in which insurance 
companies could gain the necessary approval to lawfully issue insurance policies . . . nothing 
more.”).   
 425. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Personal Lines Regulatory Framework 
(Draft Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/ 
committees_ex_speed_personal_lines_framework07.doc. 
 426. Id. at Section 1. 
 427. Id. at Section 8(A). 
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This provision fails to address the problem of invalid policy 
provisions in two ways.  First, this proposed draft fails specifically to 
address provisions that have been declared to be void, invalid, or 
unenforceable (or to address the kindred problems of conditional 
invalidity and the like).  But even more importantly, these standards 
apply to only the forms and the law as it exists at the time of filing.  
Nothing in the draft addresses whether, or how, insurers are to respond 
to subsequent judicial decisions invalidating provisions previously 
thought to be valid, nor does it address the exact response required of the 
insurer, the time within which the insurer must act, or any penalties that 
may be imposed by the commissioner for noncompliance.428   
Thus, while the NAIC’s current draft of its Best Practices may be a 
step in the right direction, it does not sufficiently address the problems 
of whether an insurer must remove a subsequently invalidated policy 
provision, or the specific requirements that the insurer is required to 
follow, and any penalties that may be incurred for noncompliance.   
E.  Class Actions 
1.  The NAIC Has Explicitly Rejected Class Action Treatment for 
Violations of the UTPA 
The NAIC advisory committee twice considered whether the UTPA 
should provide for class action relief.  In each case—in language largely 
echoing the notions that underlie the filed rate doctrine and filed form 
doctrine—the NAIC determined that permitting class action relief was 
inadvisable and unwarranted.   
In 1971, the Industry Advisory Committee of the NAIC 
Subcommittee to Review the Model Unfair Trade Practices Act 
submitted its report.429  When amendments were considered by the 
Industry Advisory Committee, proposals were made to specifically 
allow for consumer class actions alleging violations of unfair trade 
 
 428. Occasionally, existing state regulations include language similar to that found in Section 
8(A) of Best Practices.  See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 33-6-9(b) (West 2009) (providing that 
policies must not “contain[ ] or incorporate[ ] by reference any inconsistent, ambiguous, or 
misleading clauses, or exceptions and conditions which deceptively affect the risk purported to be 
assumed in the general coverage of the contract.”).  These regulations suffer the same infirmities as 
the Best Practices draft with respect to the duty to remove subsequently invalidated provisions in 
policies. 
 429. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Proceedings, 1971-2 NAIC Proc. 341, 
341 (1971). 
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practices.430  The report submitted by the Industry Advisory Committee 
on June 16, 1971 noted that the Industry Advisory Committee was 
specifically directed to consider whether class actions should be 
permitted.431   
The result of this was a strong recommendation by the Industry 
Advisory Committee against the inclusion of any provision for consumer 
class action suits.432  The committee determined that class action 
treatment was inappropriate in a heavily regulated industry, and that 
private class actions would be “wasteful at best and more likely chaotic” 
than helpful: 
F.  Consumer Class Actions   
The Industry Advisory Committee strongly recommends against the 
inclusion in the Model Act of any provision for consumer class action 
suits for damages resulting from violation of the Act, whether 
accompanied or not by a “trigger” mechanism that is a finding by the 
commissioner that the Act has been violated.  Such a provision is 
unnecessary and undesirable for the following reasons: 
 
1. The common law in all states recognizes the principle of 
representative actions, so the consumer is not without remedy in this 
area; 
 
2. There is less reason for such legislation as applied to a heavily 
regulated industry such as insurance (characterized by Commissioner 
Durkin in his testimony on S. 984, S. 1222 and S. 1378 as “pervasive” 
regulation); 
 
 430. Id. at 342. 
 431. The report stated:  
The Industry Advisory Committee held its initial meeting, at the request of the NAIC, at 
the Zone V meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico on April 26. . . .  As a result of that 
meeting Commissioner Durkin, as co-chairman of the Subcommittee, on May 14th 
distributed a letter setting forth various items which the Industry Advisory Committee 
was to consider.  
 
As a result of the various federal proposals to create consumer class actions for damages 
produced by the commission of unfair trade practices, some of which proposals would 
include insurance services, the Advisory Committee was asked to be ready to discuss 
this subject.  The proposals in this area include: 1) unlimited class action rights; 2) a 
right to a class action triggered only by a finding by the Commissioner that an unfair 
trade practice has been committed; and 3) empower the Commissioner to sue on behalf 
of injured members of a class for damages sustained.   
Id. at 343-44. 
 432. Id. at 350-52. 
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3. The regulator already has the practical power to accomplish on 
behalf of the consumer what consumer less actions are designed to 
accomplish.  This is evident from the testimony of Commissioner 
Barger in connection with Senate Bill 3201 in August 1970 (1970 
NAIC Proceedings pages 135-144) and from Commissioner Durkin’s 
testimony on S. 984, S. 1222 and S. 1378 in April, 1971; 
 
4. Insurers will never be able to rely on the decision of the regulator.  If 
policyholders are able to challenge the decision of the Commissioner 
through the use of the class action, the whole regulatory mechanism 
will be subverted.  A number of class actions have been filed 
challenging medical pay offsets in uninsured motorists coverage -- 
forms approved by the insurance department; 
 
5. Consumer class actions will result in “judicial” regulation of the 
insurance business; 
 
6. The class action principle has been abused in practice.  The principal 
beneficiaries have been the attorneys.  There is much criticism of the 
federal rules because of the basic inequities in this area; 
 
7. The types of class actions being experienced today have industry-
wide implications—not restricted to isolated acts by one insurer.  
There is an obvious impact on loss experience, market capacity, and 
perhaps solvency of insurers; 
 
8. Class actions tend to encourage champerty, maintenance and the 
impropriety of attorneys stirring up litigation; 
 
9. Many of the laws regulating the business are not completely clear, 
particularly in terms of new practices, etc.  As a result, an insurer 
would not be able to safely rely on the opinion of counsel nor perhaps 
even the decision of the regulator because of the fear of a class action.  
This will unduly inhibit the industry in developing new forms and 
procedures; and 
 
10. The costs of defense of class action suits are prohibitive.  Litigation 
minded persons can shop forums until the defendant bows to the yolk 
of defense costs and agrees to a settlement. 
 
The Industry Advisory Committee is well aware of the Congressional 
activity in this area.  We support the NAIC's action in seeking to 
exclude insurance services from the ambit of the current legislative 
proposals.  Commissioners Barger and Durkin, in their testimony 
before the U.S. Senate Committees considering consumer class 
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actions, gave a number of examples of how the state regulatory process 
protects the consumer and how the commissioners assist the public in 
areas covered by the class action suits.  These same examples not only 
support the system of state regulation, but also stand for the 
proposition that the insurance consumer has no real need for this 
additional legislation.  As applied to the insurance industry, the 
Industry Advisory Committee endorses the statement of Simon H. 
Rifkind, Esq., a former federal judge, in testifying on S. 3201 
(Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Consumer 
Protection Act of 1970, p. 382): 
 
“Finally, the most important question, . . . is whether class actions are 
the best or even an appropriate means to protect consumers from unfair 
or deceptive practices.  Law suits are most effective when an 
individual or a discrete group of individuals is seriously harmed by 
another person’s conduct.  When the injurious conduct instead causes 
widespread, extremely diffuse harm inflicting relatively small 
individual wounds on many, many people or the population generally, 
the conduct is normally best regulated by a government.   
 
Difficulties encountered with the administrative approach should not 
lead us to fly willy-nilly to regulation by private class action that 
would be wasteful at best and more likely chaotic in its consequences.”   
 
Even without additional special causes of action being created for the 
consumer, class action law suits against insurers are becoming 
numerous and troublesome, to say nothing of the expense.   
 
Similar objections lie to any suggestion that the commissioner be 
entitled to bring class actions for damages arising out of the violation 
of the Model Act.  Such power would change the role of the 
commissioner from that of a regulator to a collection agency.  It will 
produce conflict between commissioners where there are differences of 
opinion as to whether the Act has been violated and will engender 
great public and political pressure upon the commissioners, 
particularly where a neighboring department has utilized its power in 
this area.  Such conflict will destroy comity between the states, 
resulting ultimately in federal regulation.  The best solution for the 
consumer is effective regulation.433 
The matter was further debated in a meeting of the Unfair Trade 
Practices Subcommittee of the NAIC that met in late November and 
 
 433. Id. at 350-352. 
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early December of 1971.434  The NAIC Subcommittee determined that 
strong administrative regulation, rather than class action treatment, was 
the better approach for handling unfair trade practices claims involving 
insurers.435  The Subcommittee then recommended the model Unfair 
Trade Practices Act (without any provision for class action suits) for 
adoption by the NAIC.436   
It is clear that the NAIC and its Subcommittee considered class 
action treatment for UTPA violations neither practical nor appropriate.  
This decision is consistent with both the difficulties in maintaining a 
class action in suits of this type (which will be addressed in the 
following section), as well as the filed rate and filed form doctrines 
discussed in Section III(A)(2) above.   
1.  Class Action Treatment is Inappropriate in Common Law Fraud 
Actions 
Fraud can be based upon either an overt misrepresentation or a 
failure to disclose.  To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, 
the plaintiff must prove (1) a representation or, where there is a duty to 
disclose, concealment of a fact; (2) which is material to the transaction at 
hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter 
disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that 
knowledge may be inferred; (4) with the intent of misleading another 
into relying upon it; (5) justifiable reliance upon the representation or 
concealment; and (6) a resulting injury proximately caused by the 
reliance.437   
 
 434. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Proceedings, 1972-1 NAIC Proc. 490 
(1972). 
 435. It provided: 
The Subcommittee points out that several other areas were discussed but are not part of 
the recommended bill. 
. . . 
With respect to class action provisions, the final decision of the Subcommittee was that a 
provision relating to class actions was inappropriate at this time in view of the 
circumstances.  Furthermore, the Subcommittee felt that the remedies in the model bill 
provide broad relief, thus affording the insurance consumer the complete protection of 
the Insurance Department, including Insurance Department complaint handling 
mechanisms, which has proved to be a most effective mode of redress.  In addition, the 
Subcommittee felt that a provision with respect to class actions might restrict rather than 
expand the relief possible. 
Id. at 491. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ohio 1987); Burr v. Bd. of 
County Comm’rs of Stark County, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1102 (Ohio 1986); Yo-Can, Inc. v. Yogurt 
Exchange, Inc., 778 N.E.2d 80, 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Watkins v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 719 
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Any attempt to lessen the substantive legal requirements that are 
required to prove a prima facie case by using the vehicle of a class 
action (rather than just naming individual plaintiffs) would violate due 
process.438  A presumption of reliance is inappropriate in common law 
fraud cases not only because reliance and proximate cause are inherently 
individualized inquiries, but also because presuming injury to a class 
that includes people who were not injured would violate due process.439  
Put differently, the courts have “no power to define differently the 
substantive right of individual plaintiffs as compared to class 
plaintiffs.”440  Even if a presumption of reliance could be used, due 
process would require that that presumption be rebuttable for each class 
member individually.   
The use of a presumption of reliance was approved in the context of 
a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claim in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.441  The 
plaintiffs in Basic alleged that material misrepresentations had been 
made due to the company’s explicit (but false) denial that merger 
negotiations were taking place.442  The question before the Court was 
whether the plaintiffs were required to prove that each investor in the 
plaintiff class relied on those misrepresentations.443   
The Supreme Court held that they were not.444  In part, the Court’s 
decision was based on the fact that publicly-made misrepresentations 
would inherently affect the price of stock purchased by the investors, 
regardless of whether each individual investor was aware of and relied 
on these misrepresentations.445   
Post-Basic federal decisions have generally held that the 
presumption of reliance only applies in “fraud-on-the-market” cases, and 
is not generally applicable to garden variety common law actions.  In 
 
N.E.2d 1052, 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Able/S.S., Inc. v. KM & E Services, Inc., No. 2000-L-
162, 2002 WL 31663550 at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2002). 
 438. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Even if amended 
Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any such fantastic procedure, the courts would have to reject it 
as an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due process of law.”); Tucker v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“Justification for the use of a presumption of 
reliance . . . should not . . . be premised on the bringing of the . . . suit as a class action, for this 
would raise a serious question of modification of substantive rights in violation of the Rules 
Enabling Act.”). 
 439. See Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1977). 
 440. Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 441. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 442. Id. at 227. 
 443. Id. at 230. 
 444. Id. at 248-49. 
 445. Id.  
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fact, in the Official Comment to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 
the drafters indicated that a fraud class action might be inappropriate 
where individual questions of reliance are at issue.446  Given this 
cautionary statement, federal courts have generally refrained from 
certifying fraud class actions where individual reliance is at issue.447   
Federal courts have also resisted expanding the fraud-on-the-market 
theory to permit the use of a presumption of reliance outside the 
securities context.  In Gunnells v. Healthplan Services, Inc.,448 the court 
of appeals reversed the trial court’s use of a Basic presumption of 
reliance in a common law fraud case.449  The Gunnells court held that 
neither Basic nor any other case supported a presumption of reliance in 
such a case.450  The court observed that in the securities context, the 
“capacity of the capital markets to rapidly assimilate public information 
into stock prices” justified a presumption of reliance.451  But the court 
 
 446. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Official Comment (“In this view, a fraud perpetrated on numerous 
persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, 
and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the 
damages suffered by individuals within the class.  On the other hand, although having some 
common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material 
variation in the representations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom 
they were addressed.”). 
 447. Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Because proof of 
reliance is generally individualized to each plaintiff allegedly defrauded, fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims are not readily susceptible to class action treatment, precluding 
certification of such actions as a class action.”); In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Securities Litig., 211 
F.R.D. 219, 223-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing to certify class where individual issues of reliance 
would predominate because a class-wide presumption was improper); Yadlosky v. Grant Thornton 
L.L.P., 197 F.R.D. 292, 298-99 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that where securities were not sold in an 
open and efficient market, investors were not entitled to a presumption of reliance, thereby 
necessitating individual proof of reliance for claims of common law fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and similar claims); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 
1996) (“According to both the advisory committee’s notes to Rule 23(b)(3) and this court’s decision 
in Simon v. Merrill Lynch . . . , a fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will 
be an issue.”); Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 189 F.R.D. 544, 551 n.3 (D. Minn. 1999) 
(“Because recovery under common law fraud requires a finding of individual reliance and because 
individual proof of reliance precludes class certification, the Court summarily denies class 
certification of Plaintiffs’ common law fraud theory of recovery.”); Andrews v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 
1014, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996) (decertifying class because “the plaintiffs would . . . have to show, on 
an individual basis, that they relied on the misrepresentations, suffered injury as a result, and 
incurred a demonstrable amount of damages”); Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 
155 F.3d 331, 341 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he reliance element of . . . fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims [is] not readily susceptible to class-wide proof. . . .  [P]roof of reasonable 
reliance . . . depend[s] upon a fact-intensive inquiry into what information each [plaintiff] actually 
had . . . .”). 
 448. 348 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 449. Id. at 435. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. 
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contrasted that with a situation where the plaintiffs alleged ordinary 
fraud and misrepresentation.452  In the latter case, the court concluded 
that if an individual plaintiff was not aware of the alleged 
misrepresentations, there was no basis for presuming that they were a 
proximate cause of their damages.453   
Again, in Sikes v. Teleline, Inc.,454 the parent of a young child who 
repeatedly called an automated 900-number “Let’s Make A Deal” game 
brought a class action against the phone company asserting claims under 
RICO and various state laws.455  The district court certified the class, and 
later denied a separate motion for decertification.456  The Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should 
have decertified the class.457  In doing so, it held that a fraud-on-the-
market presumption of reliance was inappropriate in RICO or other 
fraud cases.458  The Sikes Court agreed with the conclusion in Gunnells, 
stating that: 
The securities market presents a wholly different context than a 
consumer fraud case, and neither this circuit nor the Supreme Court 
has extended a presumption of reliance outside the context of securities 
cases.459   
As shown above, because it is inappropriate to use a presumption of 
reliance outside of the Rule 10b-5 context, federal courts have 
 
 452. Id. at 435-36 
 453. Id. 
 454. 281 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 455. Id. at 1355-58. 
 456. Id. at 1358. 
 457. Id. at 1368. 
 458. Id. at 1363-64. 
 459. Id. at 1363.  Other federal circuit cases have rejected the use of the Basic presumption 
outside of the securities law context include.  Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 666 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“The shortcut of a presumption of reliance typically has been applied in cases involving 
securities fraud and, even then, the presumption applies only in cases primarily involving ‘a failure 
to disclose’—that is, cases based on omissions as opposed to affirmative misrepresentations.”); 
Appletree Square I, Ltd. Partnership v. W.R. Grace & Co., 29 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“Courts have generally limited the use of the fraud-on-the-market theory to securities fraud 
cases.”); Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1369 n.39 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The fraud 
on the market theory of securities law, however, is based on concepts and policies that simply do 
not apply in a products liability case.”); Summit Properties, Inc. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 
F.3d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 2000) (“No court has accepted the use of [the fraud-on-the-market] theory 
outside of the context of securities fraud, and one circuit has expressly rejected its use in the context 
of a similar civil RICO case.  An efficient market is a critical element of a market’s role as an 
intermediary.  There is no pretense of such a market here and the fraud on the market doctrine is not 
applicable.”). 
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consistently held that common law fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation suits are “poor candidates” for class treatment.460   
State courts have likewise refused to certify common law fraud 
class actions because of the inherently individual nature of any alleged 
reliance.  They agree with the federal decisions that hold that a 
presumption of reliance is inappropriate in such cases.  For example, in 
Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.,461 the court reversed certification 
of a plaintiff class who alleged that they were deceived into becoming 
smokers because the defendants lied about nicotine’s addictive 
properties.462  The court held that reliance had to be established on an 
individual basis, even if that meant that the trial would take “hundreds of 
years.”463 
Again, in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe,464 a class of dentists who 
had purchased dental practice management software filed suit against the 
seller asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of express and 
implied warranties, fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and violations 
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.465  The trial court certified 
the class, and the court of appeals affirmed.466   
The Texas Supreme Court reversed.467  In doing so, it held that 
reliance was an essential element of five of the plaintiffs’ causes of 
action.468  It also held that the procedural class action device was not a 
shortcut that would allow the plaintiff class members to enjoy a 
presumption that would not be available to any individual plaintiff had 
their claim been brought separately.469  Rather, each and every one of the 
20,000 class members was to be held to the same standards of proof of 
reliance (and every other element of their claims) that would be required 
if each had filed suit individually.470   
The theory of any suit against an insurer for failure to remove an 
invalid policy provision will almost certainly be based on some species 
of fraud or nondisclosure.  But as the foregoing indicates, it is almost 
 
 460. See, e.g., McManus v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 320 F.3d 545, 549-50 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 241 F.3d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 2001); Castano, 84 F.3d at 745. 
 461. 679 N.Y.S.2d 593 (App. Div. 1998). 
 462. Id. at  597, 606. 
 463. Id. at 602. 
 464. 102 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2003). 
 465. Id. at 678. 
 466. Id. at 679. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. at 693. 
 469. Id. at 693-94. 
 470. Id. at 693. 
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universally accepted that fraud claims are the poorest candidates for 
constitutionally appropriate class action treatment.  They therefore do 
not represent a suitable vehicle for the resolution of claims based on an 
insurer’s failure to remove an invalid policy provision.   
2.  Class Action Treatment is Inappropriate Because There is No 
Way to Identify Policyholders Who Sustained a Loss But Did 
Not Report it Because of the Presence of the Invalid Policy 
Provision 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and generally their state 
counterparts) require that, before a class action can be certified, the 
members of the class must be identifiable.471  But as noted above, neither 
a plaintiff’s attorney nor the insurer would know the identity of any 
insureds who sustained a loss, read their policy, and erroneously 
concluded that the loss would not be covered because they saw an 
invalid provision in the policy that appeared to bar coverage.   
It has been held that for a class to be identifiable, the class 
definition must be precise enough to permit identification of class 
members with “reasonable effort,”472 meaning that it must be 
administratively feasible to determine whether any particular individual 
is a member of the class.473  The test of identifiability is “whether the 
means is specified at the time of certification to determine whether a 
particular individual is a member of the class.”474  Classic examples of 
class definitions that are too vague and ambiguous to warrant 
certification are “all poor people,” “all people active in the peace 
movement,” and “all people who have been or may be harassed by the 
police.”475   
It is not possible for either plaintiffs’ counsel or an insurer to 
identify which insureds (if any) refrained from presenting a claim 
because of the presence of an invalid condition or exclusion in a policy.  
Since it is not possible for anyone to identify those class members, a 
class could be certified only if it was composed of some other group of 
 
 471. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 472. Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 694 N.E.2d 442, 448 (Ohio 1998) (quoting Warner v. Waste 
Mgt., Inc., 521 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ohio 1988)). 
 473. Petty v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), appeal not 
allowed 772 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 2002). 
 474. Hamilton, 694 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. 
Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ohio 1990)). 
 475. Warner v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 521 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ohio 1988) (holding that such 
classes are “too amorphous to permit identification within a reasonable effort”).  
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individuals, whose definition would almost certainly be over-inclusive.  
An over-inclusive definition might consist of all persons holding policies 
issued by the insurer that included the invalid provision over a specified 
period of time.  That is a group of individuals who could be identified 
from the insurer’s own records.   
However, that would not be an appropriate class because the 
overwhelming majority—indeed, perhaps all—of the class members 
never knew of the presence of the invalid provision in their policies, 
much less failed to present a covered claim because of its presence.  To 
allow a group of people who sustained no injury and no damage because 
of the presence of the invalid provision constitutes an unwarranted 
windfall to these plaintiffs (and their counsel).  Tort law is intended to 
make injured persons whole.  It is not intended to provide an 
unjustifiable windfall to a class of individuals for the sole reason that 
they happened to be lucky enough to purchase an insurance policy that 
fortuitously contained an invalid provision that was unrelated to any loss 
they sustained or any claim they presented.   
IV.  UNIFORM LEGISLATION IS AN APPROPRIATE MECHANISM TO 
FASHION RELIEF 
A.  Since the Passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the NAIC Has 
Often Promulgated Model Laws 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) 
was founded in 1871 to help coordinate the system of state regulation.476  
On May 24, 1871—only six years after the end of the Civil War—the 
chief insurance regulators of 19 of the 36 states met in New York City 
for the first meeting of the organization that later became known as the 
NAIC.477  By 1872, more than 30 states were represented.478  At that 
time, the organization adopted a statement of objectives at its second 
meeting.479   
 
 476. RONALD KESSLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE GAME 209 (1985). 
 477. James W. Schacht et al., A Study on State Authority: Making a Case for Proper Insurance 
Oversight at 63 (Draft July 2007), http://www.ncoil.org/policy/Docs/2007/PhaseIReport.pdf. 
 478. Id. at 63. 
 479. Id. at 63-64 (“The objective of this association shall be to promote uniformity in 
legislation affecting insurance; to encourage uniformity in departmental rulings under the insurance 
laws of the several states; to disseminate information of value to insurance supervisory officials in 
the performance of their duties; to establish ways and means of fully protecting the interest of 
insurance policyholders of the various states, territories, and insular possessions of the United States 
and to preserve to the several states, the regulation of the business of insurance.” (citing James W. 
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In 1944, after the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,480 it rejected 
nearly a century of prior decisions holding that insurance was not 
interstate commerce.481  In response to this ruling, the insurance industry 
devised a plan to head off federal regulation.482  The industry persuaded 
Congress to pass the McCarran-Ferguson Act,483 which provided a three-
year moratorium on federal regulation of the insurance industry.484  At 
the end of that period, federal regulators would be permitted to assert 
their authority only over those aspects of the insurance industry not 
regulated by the states.485  This moratorium gave the NAIC time to draft 
model legislation intended to preempt the entire field of insurance 
industry regulation, thus protecting it from federal regulation by the 
Federal Trade Commission or any other administrative agency.486   
When the NAIC was originally created, its first major step in the 
process of coordinating the regulation of multi-state insurers was the 
development of uniform financial reporting standards.487  The Bylaws of 
the NAIC488 establish eight standing committees, all of which are 
charged with considering issues relating to their particular aspect of the 
insurance market.489   
B.  The NAIC Has Often Promulgated Model Statutes and Rules in Other 
Contexts Where Uniformity is Desirable 
The structure of the NAIC, established by its Bylaws, enables it to 
adopt model laws, regulations, and guidelines on a wide variety of 
subjects.  At this writing, the NAIC has promulgated 219 model laws.490  
As might be expected from the breadth of the subcommittees and the 
 
Schacht, NAIC Finances and Funding, a discussion paper for the 1995 NAIC Commissioners 
Conference at 3 (January 1995))).  
 480. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 481. Id. at 552-53. 
 482. ASHLEY, supra note 257, at § 9:2. 
 483. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (West 2009). 
 484. ASHLEY, supra note 257, at § 9:2. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. 
 487. The NAIC’s History and Background, http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited 
on Mar. 11, 2009). 
 488. Id. 
 489. See id. at Article VI. 
 490. The NAIC Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines are published in five volumes, which 
can be found in the NAIC database on www.lexis.com.  In addition, both a Table of Contents that 
identifies all extant draft model laws, rules and regulations, plus a subject matter outline, are 
available on the NAIC website, http://www.naic.org/index_committees.htm. 
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NAIC’s purpose, these 219 model laws address a wide variety of topics 
in most of the major product lines.491   
The eight standing committees include the Life Insurance and 
Annuities Committee, the Health Insurance and Managed Care 
Committee, the Property and Casualty Insurance Committee, the Market 
Regulation and Consumer Affairs Committee, the Financial Condition 
Committee, the Financial Regulation Standards and Accreditation 
Committee, the International Insurance Relations Committee, and the 
Information Resources Management Committee.   
The Bylaws permit the Executive Committee, the Subcommittee of 
the Executive Committee, and the Standing Committees to establish one 
or more Task Forces that automatically terminate at the end of the NAIC 
Winter National Meeting.  However, if an existing Task Force is dealing 
with insurance problems that require continuing study, the Executive 
Committee may adopt the recommendation of the parent Committee or 
the Subcommittee that it be designated a Standing Task Force.   
In addition to the model laws that have been promulgated, the 
NAIC also makes available drafts of regulations that are presently under 
consideration.  At the time of this writing, some ten discussion drafts 
were available on the NAIC website covering topics as diverse as the 
preferred mortality tables for use in determining minimum reserve 
liabilities, the fiduciary responsibilities of insurance producers, 
insurance regulatory class action reform, medical malpractice closed 
claim reporting, and the creation of a comprehensive national plan for 
natural catastrophe risk.492   
The flagship of the NAIC model acts was its original Unfair Trade 
Practices Act.493  The UTPA was carefully drafted to confer the same 
broad regulatory powers over the insurance industry upon state 
regulators that Congress had delegated to the Federal Trade 
Commission.494  It forbade any insurer from engaging in an unfair 
method of competition, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the 
 
 491. The NAIC Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines specifically address, for example, 
product lines as diverse as accident and health insurance, licensing and regulations of 
agents/brokers/producers, regulation of annuities and variable contracts, credit insurance, 
examination of insurers, HMOs, holding companies, insider trading and proxies, insolvency, life 
insurance regulation, long-term care insurance, Medicare supplement insurance, property and 
casualty insurance, reinsurance, unauthorized insurance, and unfair trade practices. 
 492. NAIC Committees and Activities, http://www.naic.org/index_committees.htm (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2009). 
 493. NAIC Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines, V-880-1. 
 494. ASHLEY, supra note 257. 
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business of insurance.495  Section 4 of the UTPA defined various specific 
unfair practices, which were for the most part anticompetitive acts.496  
Section 5 empowered the insurance commissioner to investigate unfair 
insurance practices, and Sections 6 and 7 authorized the commissioner to 
hold hearings and issue cease and desist orders.497  Section 11 authorized 
the commissioner to bring a civil action against an insurer who violated 
such an order, and to collect fines in nominal amounts.498   
The NAIC promulgated major amendments to the UTPA in 1971, 
which expanded the definition of unfair practices to include a number of 
unfair claim settlement practices.499  In June 1990, the NAIC again 
adopted amendments to the UTPA that separated the provisions dealing 
with unfair claims settlement into a newly adopted Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Model Act.500  The purpose of this action was to 
make clearer the distinction between general unfair trade practices on the 
one hand and unfair claim settlement practices on the other, and to focus 
on market conduct practices and market conduct regulation.501   
The NAIC has historically, then, addressed issues comparable to 
the question here presented.  Indeed, the NAIC has even promulgated 
specific criteria addressing whether and when a new model law or 
regulation, or an amendment to an existing model law or regulation, 
should be adopted.  Under the NAIC’s published standards, a new model 
law is appropriate where two criteria are met: 
1)  If the issue that is the subject of the Model Law necessitates a 
national standard and requires uniformity amongst all states; and 
 
2) Where NAIC Members are committed to devoting significant 
regulator and association resources to educate, communicate and 
support a model that has been adopted by the membership. 502 
 
 495. Id. 
 496. Id. 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. 
 499. See Unfair Claims Settlement Practices, Web Content for Lawyers, available at 
http://www.nextclient.com/services/website-\content/sample_articles/getSampleContent.jsp? 
orderid=78 (last accessed Feb. 27, 2009). 
 500. Id. 
 501. See Prefatory Note to the 4/17/2008 revisions to the Unfair Trade Practices Act (model 
880), available at http://www.naic.org/meetings0806/plenary_agenda_attachments.pdf (last 
accessed Feb. 27, 2009). 
 502. The NAIC Procedures for Model Law Development are available from the NAIC website 
at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_models_procedures.pdf (last accessed Feb. 20, 
2009). 
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Whether the member regulators of the NAIC would be “committed 
to devoting significant regulator and association resources” to support 
the author’s proposed legislation cannot be predicted.  But the proposed 
model law concerning removal or amendment of invalid policy 
provisions attached as Appendix A is certainly a subject that warrants a 
national standard and requires uniformity amongst all states.  The 
absence of any meaningful or uniform standards results in a patchwork 
of inconsistent judicial declarations, rendering it impossible for an 
insurer to predict what it must do, when it must do it, or the penalty that 
may be assessed for any failure timely to act.  Specifically, uniformity is 
essential for consistency in identifying: 
1)  whether and when a policy provision has in fact been declared 
to be unconditionally unenforceable; 
2)  what the insurer must do when a policy provision has been 
declared to be unconditionally enforceable; 
3)  when the insurer must act; 
4)  the effect of a declaration of invalidity or unenforceability by a 
trial court or intermediate court of appeals, that has not been accepted 
for review by the court of last resort in that jurisdiction; 
5)  whether any action is required by an insurer with respect to a 
policy provision that has only been declared to be conditionally 
unenforceable; 
6)  whether there is a private right of action for a violation of the 
duty to remove or amend an invalid provision; and 
7)  whether an insurer is required to notify policyholders of changes 
in the law occasioned by court decision or by statute, including decisions 
or statutes that either conditionally or unconditionally invalidate policy 
provisions.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the view of this author, the answer to the question of whether or 
when an insurer is duty bound to remove invalid provisions from its 
policy is best made by those charged with ascertaining and setting public 
policy.  If insurers are to be required to remove invalid provisions from 
their policies, it is preferable that that requirement be imposed by rule or 
statute rather than case law.  The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners has long issued model legislation for adoption by state 
legislatures or departments of insurance.  Utilization of model rules 
promotes the goals of uniformity and predictability.  It is only fair that 
insurers know what is expected of them in this developing area.   
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The proposed solution set forth in the Appendix A below is fair.  It 
requires insurers to take timely action if—but only if—a policy 
provision has been unconditionally invalidated by the legislature or by a 
state’s court of last resort.  There will no longer be a question of whether 
it is permissible for an insurer to permit an invalid provision to remain 
after it has been unconditionally invalidated by a state’s highest court.  
By the same token, it will also be clear to insurers that they are not 
obligated to change their policies in response to lower court decisions 
invalidating policy provisions, or in cases where that provision is only 
conditionally unenforceable or where enforceability is merely doubtful.   
The rights of the parties to insurance contracts will be clearer from 
both perspectives.  Insureds will receive the timely modifications to their 
policies in response to unconditional invalidations of policy provisions, 
while insurers will be insulated from lawsuits challenging the nature or 
timeliness of their response to judicial decisions impacting the validity 
of policy provisions.   
One of the most fundamental policies of the law is to permit 
persons and entities accurately to predict what is (and is not) required of 
them, and the penalties for noncompliance.  The proposed legislation set 
forth below will accomplish precisely that purpose. 
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APPENDIX A—PROPOSED MODEL LEGISLATION 
Removal or Amendment of Invalid Policy Provisions 
 
Section 1. Purpose 
 The purpose of this Act is to establish rules for determining 
whether, when, and how insurers are required to remove provisions from 
their policies that have been held to be void, invalid or unenforceable. 
 
Section 2. Applicability 
 This Act shall apply to all policies of insurance issued by 
insurance companies authorized to do business in this state. 
 
Section 3. When the Duty to Remove Exists 
 A.  No duty to remove or amend any policy provision exists 
unless that provision has been declared to be unconditionally void, 
invalid or unenforceable by this state’s highest appellate court or by the 
legislature.  For the purpose of this section, a provision is not considered 
to have been held to be unconditionally void, invalid, or unenforceable 
by the [state court of last resort] in any case where that court 1) has 
simply declined to accept an appeal of a trial court or an intermediate 
court of appeals decision holding the provision to be invalid or 
unenforceable; or 2) invalidated another type of policy provision using 
language that suggests inferentially that the provision in question might 
also be invalid. 
 B.  Where a policy provision has been held to be unconditionally 
void, invalid, or unenforceable by a trial court or by an intermediate 
court of appeals, then that provision may not be enforced within the 
geographic boundaries of that intermediate appellate court’s jurisdiction.  
However, no insurer is required to remove or amend a policy provision 
that has been held to be invalid or unenforceable by any court other than 
the state’s highest appellate court. 
 C.  No insurer shall file with the Department of Insurance, or 
issue to its insureds, any new or revised policy form or endorsement 
containing a provision prohibited by statute or by regulation, or which 
has been declared to be unconditionally void, invalid, or unenforceable 
by the [state court of last resort]. 
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Section 4. Time for Removal of Invalid Provisions 
 A.  When a policy provision has been rendered unconditionally 
void, invalid, or unenforceable by the [state court of last resort] or by an 
act of the state legislature, then each insurer whose policies include that 
provision must, within 90 days after the date of the decision or the 
effective date of the statute, file a proposed form revision with the 
Department of Insurance deleting the provision or amending it to bring it 
into conformity with the decision or statute. 
 B.  No duty to remove or amend the provision exists unless and 
until the Department of Insurance has approved the proposed form 
revision. 
 C.  After the Department of Insurance has approved the proposed 
form revision deleting the provision, then the insurer must roll the 
revised form onto new business beginning 30 days after the effective 
date of the approval, and to existing business upon the first renewal of 
each existing policy that takes place beginning 30 days after the date of 
approval. 
 
Section 5. No Private Right of Action 
 A.  There shall be no private right of action for a violation of this 
Act. 
 B.  No private right of action against an insurance company may 
be based, in whole or in part, upon an insurer’s failure to remove or 
amend an invalid policy provision if the insurer has complied with the 
requirements of this Act. 
 C.  No insurer is required to notify policyholders of changes in 
the law occasioned by any court decision or by statute, or of any 
corresponding effect on coverage under its policies. 
 
Section 6. Penalties 
 A.  The Commissioner may issue, in accordance with [citation to 
the applicable state administrative procedure act], a cease and desist 
order upon any person or organization that violates any provisions of 
this Act, or regulation or order adopted by the Commissioner 
promulgated hereunder. 
 B.  The Commissioner may suspend or revoke the license of any 
insurer that fails to comply with an order of the Commissioner within the 
time specified in the order, or any extension thereof that the 
Commissioner may grant.  The Commissioner may determine when a 
suspension of a license shall become effective and it shall remain in 
effect for the period fixed by the Commissioner, unless the suspension is 
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modified or rescinded, or until the order upon which the suspension is 
based is modified, rescinded, or reversed.  
 C.  In addition to any other penalties or enforcement provisions of 
this Act, any person or organization who violates this Act is subject to 
civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation, but if the violation is 
found to be willful, a penalty of not more than $25,000 may be imposed 
for each violation.  These penalties are in addition to any other penalty 
or remedy provided by law.  For purposes of this section, an insurer who 
has failed to comply with this Act shall be deemed to have committed a 
separate violation for each day the violation occurred.  
 
Section 7. Effective Date 
 A.  This Act shall become effective [insert date] and shall apply 
to all insurance policies in effect at any time on or after the effective 
date. 
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